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LEAD ARTICLE
SENATE DEMOCRACY:
OUR LOCKEAN PARADOX
ERIC W. ORTS *
The United States Senate is radically unrepresentative. American citizens
in populous states such as California, Texas, Florida, and New York have
much less voting weight than citizens in lightly populated states. Senate
representation is also significantly biased in terms of race, ethnicity, and color,
as well as other constitutionally protected characteristics such as age and sex.
Effective reform of the Senate, however, presents a Lockean paradox because
amendment of its representational structure is prohibited by Article V of the
Constitution, and the amendment of Article V is blocked by supermajority hurdles.
This Article proposes a Senate Reform Act to resolve this paradox. This
reform would adjust the number of senators allocated to each state by relative
population. It recommends a Rule of One Hundred to determine population
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units by which to allocate senate seats according the official decennial census, with
a minimum of one senator per state. The reform would thus respect the principle of
federalism and maintain the Senate at roughly the same size. It would yield
structural co-benefits such as a more representative Electoral College and an easier
path to statehood for underrepresented citizens in the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and elsewhere.
The proposed Senate Reform Act finds its constitutional authority in the Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. After
explaining how the reform would work, this Article defends its constitutionality through
traditional modes of interpretation: text, structure, history, moral principle, and legal
precedent. It concludes with an examination of political balance and feasibility.
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[I]t often comes to pass that in governments where part of the legislative
consists of representatives chosen by the people, that in tract of time this
representation becomes very unequal and disproportionate to the reasons it
was at first established . . . . This strangers stand amazed at, and everyone
must confess needs a remedy; though most think it hard to find one, because
the constitution of the legislative being the original and supreme act of the
society, antecedent to all positive laws in it and depending wholly on the
people, no inferior power can alter it . . . .
Whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society
and people in general . . . will always, when done, justify itself; and
whenever the people shall choose their representatives upon just and
undeniably equal measures, suitable to the original frame of government, it
cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society, whoever permitted or
caused them so to do.

—John Locke 1
[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the
human mind. [A]s that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new
discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions
change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also,
and keep pace with the times.

—Thomas Jefferson 2
Heaven lends me ability, to use my voice, my pen, or my vote, to advocate
the . . . emancipation of my entire race.

—Frederick Douglass 3

1. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 157–58, at 89–91
(Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952) (1690).
2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 226 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2013).
3. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM 406 (1857).
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Senate is radically unrepresentative. At the founding,
the ratio of voting weight in the Senate between citizens in the smallest
state of Delaware and the largest state of Virginia was around nine to one
or twelve to one, depending on whether slaves are counted. 4 James
Madison predicted that this inequality would get worse, and he was
right. 5 As new states were added, and as people multiplied and
migrated, the ratios of voting inequality of citizens in the smallest and
largest states widened. Today, the ratio of voting weight of citizens in
the smallest state of Wyoming compared with those in the largest state
of California has ballooned to sixty-seven to one. 6 The disparities will
only worsen because more populous states, such as California,

4. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 184 (2016) (calculating a ratio of 12.5 to one). Subtracting Virginia’s
400,000 slaves, the ratio falls to about nine to one. RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST
MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 310 (2000); see also U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, 1790 CENSUS, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/media/us-census-1790
[https://perma.cc/FPB7-CKBC]. In the five southern states of the original thirteen,
forty percent of the population was enslaved. KLARMAN, supra, at 266.
5. See FRANCES E. LEE & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, SIZING UP THE SENATE: THE
UNEQUAL CONSEQUENCES OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 10 (1999). Madison along with
other founders including James Wilson of Pennsylvania argued unsuccessfully for
proportional representation in the Senate. See BEEMAN, supra note 4, at 55, 105;
KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 130–31; see also Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112
HARV. L. REV. 611, 627, 654–56 (1999) (describing Madison’s plan for a strong
national government with proportional representation of citizens in both houses of
Congress); David Brian Robertson, Madison’s Opponents and Constitutional Design, 99
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 225, 227–29 (2005) (describing Madison’s plan). The Connecticut
Compromise adopted a principle of popular representation in the House of
Representatives, but not in the Senate. Id. at 231, 235–37. It transmuted the one
colony, one vote rule of decision under the Articles of Confederation into a rule of
one state, two senators. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1–3; see also BEEMAN, supra note 4, at
118–19, 150–51, 156; KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 198–201, 205. Madison “continued
to feel deeply aggrieved about the compromise that had given the smaller states equal
representation in the Senate” and “persisted in believing that the Connecticut
Compromise was a serious blow to the fundamental principle that the new
government was to be directly representative of the people of the nation and not of
the states.” BEEMAN, supra note 4, at 367. He felt “vexed” that his theory of popular
national representation had not been fully adopted. Kramer, supra, at 678–79.
6. See infra Table 1; see also KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 626–27 (noting how “the
Senate’s malapportionment has grown significantly worse” moving from a ratio of
“roughly twelve times” at the founding to “more than sixty-five times” today).
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Florida, and Texas, are growing faster than many smaller ones. 7 By
2040, if present trends continue, two-thirds of American citizens will
be represented by only thirty senators. 8 Compared with almost every
other democratically elected national legislature in the world, the
malapportionment of the U.S. Senate is an outlier. 9 It should
therefore be reformed.
In addition to comparative voting weight of individual citizens,
another measure of representational inequality examines the
minimum percentage of the total population needed for a majority
of the smallest states to achieve a majority in the Senate—a measure
of voting power. 10 Since 1790, this percentage has fallen from around
7. See, e.g., LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 11; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
NEVADA AND IDAHO ARE THE NATION’S FASTEST-GROWING STATES (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2018/estimates-nationalstate.html [https://perma.cc/42RY-94F5] (showing California, Florida, and Texas as
top three states in population gains). According to one projection for 2100, Texas
will become the largest state and Vermont the smallest with the ratio in voting weight
rising to 154 to one. TODD N. TUCKER, ROOSEVELT INST., FIXING THE SENATE:
EQUITABLE AND FULL REPRESENTATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 8 (2019), http://
rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/RI_Fixing-The-Senate_report201903.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5ZX-ELAS] (citing study by sociologist Mathew
Hauer).
8. Philip Bump, By 2040, Two-Thirds of Americans Will Be Represented by 30 Percent
of the Senate, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/politics/wp/2017/11/28/by-2040-two-thirds-of-americans-will-be-represented-by30-percent-of-the-senate [https://perma.cc/4AQT-885S].
According to another projection based on census data, this means thirty percent
of the population will control a veto-proof sixty-eight senators by 2040. Jamelle
Bouie, The Senate Is as Much of a Problem as Trump, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2019, at SR4
(citing study by the Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, University of Virginia).
9. AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND
PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 194–97 (2d ed. 2012) (finding only Argentina
to have a more unequally representative legislative branch); see also ROBERT A. DAHL,
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 49–50 (2d ed. 2003) (criticizing
the Senate and noting that legislatures in Brazil and Russia are also radically
unrepresentative). In other democratic countries, including Australia, Canada,
Germany, and India, voting weight ratios do not exceed twenty-one to one. Adam
Liptak, Smaller States Find Outsize Clout Growing in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2013, at
A1 (citing Dahl).
10. See LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 10–11 & app. A at 237 (explaining
methodologies); Nicola Maaser & Stefan Napel, Equal Representation in Two-Tier Voting
Systems, 28 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 401–02 (2007) (explaining the difference between
voting power and voting weight).
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thirty percent to less than twenty percent.11 In other words, it is now possible
for senators representing only one-fifth of the population to pass a bill or
confirm a Supreme Court justice.12
The confirmations of Brett Kavanaugh and Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme
Court show why this inequality matters. In October 2018, the Senate
confirmed Kavanaugh by a vote of fifty to forty-eight senators, and this bare
majority represented only forty-four percent of the general population.13
In April 2017, the Senate confirmed Gorsuch by a fifty-four to forty-five
vote, with the majority representing only forty-two percent of the people. 14
Similarly, senators representing only a minority of the total population
voted to confirm Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.15 Justices Kavanaugh
and Gorsuch share the dubious distinction, however, of being both
confirmed by senators representing a minority of the population and
nominated by a president who himself won election with only a minority of
the total vote.16 They are the first of what we might call minority-minority
justices. President Trump and the Republican-controlled Senate have also

11. LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 10–11 & fig.1.1.
12. For many years, the Senate mitigated this problem regarding judicial
appointments by following an internal rule that required sixty votes for confirmation.
Matt Flegenheimer, Republicans Gut Filibuster Rule to Lift Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2017, at A1. In 2013, the Democratic majority in the Senate, frustrated by Republican
slow-walking on confirmations, exercised the so-called “nuclear option”: adopting a
simple majority rule for judicial confirmations except for the Supreme Court. Id.
Then in 2017, the Republican-controlled Senate extended the nuclear option to
include Supreme Court nominations, clearing the path for confirmations of Justices
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh by bare majority votes. Id.; see also David S. Law & Lawrence
B. Solum, Judicial Selection, Appointments Gridlock, and the Nuclear Option, 15 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 51, 60 (2006).
13. Parker Richards, The People vs. the U.S. Senate, ATLANTIC (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/senators-kavanaughrepresented-44-percent-us/572623 [https://perma.cc/XXS5-LZWE].
14. Kevin J. McMahon, Will the Supreme Court Still “Seldom Stray Very Far”?: Regime
Politics in a Polarized America, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 343, 344 tbl.1 (2018).
15. Justice Thomas was confirmed by a vote of fifty-two to forty-eight with the
majority representing forty-eight percent of the population. Id. Justice Alito was
confirmed by a vote of fifty-eight to forty-two with the majority representing fortynine percent. Id.
16. Hillary Clinton won 48.5% of the popular vote compared with 46.4% for
Donald Trump. Clinton earned 2.8 million more votes than Trump. Presidential
Results, CNN (2016), https://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results/president
[https://perma.cc/PZ7N-WB3M]; see supra notes 13 & 14.
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appointed and confirmed a record number of minority-minority judges to
the lower courts.17
The federal midterm elections in 2018 showed how inequality of
representation in the Senate can have more direct political
consequences. Democrats rode a blue wave in the popular vote and
gained forty seats in the House. 18 However, even though Democratic
senate candidates received fifty-seven percent of all senate votes cast
nationally, compared to forty-two percent for Republicans, Democrats
ended up losing two senate seats.19 One should not make too much of
this difference given that only one-third of senators are elected every two
years, and the Democrats were defending twenty-six incumbent seats
compared with nine for Republicans.20 Nevertheless, this outcome augurs
what Laurence Tribe has called “the rise of minority rule.”21 “Our
Federalism” may require some degree of unequal representation

17. These appointments include eighty-four federal judges to the appellate and
district courts, and about one hundred more are expected since Republicans
maintained control of the Senate in the 2018 midterms. Bob Bryan, The GOP’s Senate
Triumph Means Trump Can Continue the Work on ‘The Single Most Important Legacy’ of His
Presidency, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/
midterm-elections-senate-gop-judge-confirmations-2018-11
[https://perma.cc/TE4Q-NXQK].
18. See Ed Kilgore, With One Final Democratic Victory, Midterms Finally End,
INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 28, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/withone-last-democratic-victory-in-california-midterms-end.html
[https://perma.cc/VTV2-6TKG] (describing Democratic popular vote margins and
electoral success in the House of Representatives).
19. Id.; see also U.S. Senate Election Results 2018, POLITICO (May 28, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/election-results/2018/senate [https://perma.cc/XF7QYCUH].
20. Sabrina Siddiqui, Democrats Got Millions More Votes—So How Did Republicans
Win the Senate? THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/nov/08/democrats-republicans-senate-majority-minority-rule
[https://perma.cc/2CU-V7M2].
21. Id. (quoting Tribe); see also John D. Griffin, Senate Apportionment as a Source of
Political Inequality, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 405, 406 (2006) (finding “citizens of states with
less voting weight are today more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and to
espouse liberal positions on some issues, such as spending on health care and
environmental protection” and “have been more likely, since 1980, to vote for the
presidential candidates of the Democratic Party”).
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privileging smaller states,22 but to invoke a famous line from Star Wars,
unequal representation in the Senate “is getting out of hand.”23
To be sure, other governing bodies such as the European Union and
the United Nations face similar issues of how to balance representation of
historically defined sovereign territories with changing populations and
relative influence. 24 I do not invoke here an absolute principle of
equal voting for citizens in all governance contexts and situations.
This Article focuses only on the inequality of representation of citizens
in the U.S. Senate, which is increasingly difficult to justify or excuse. 25
In 1995, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York remarked:
“Sometime in the next century the United States is going to have to
address the question of apportionment in the Senate. Already we
have seven states with two senators and one representative. The
Senate is beginning to look like the pre-reform British House of

22. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971) (describing “Our Federalism,”
a concept that recognizes the value in a national government permitting states to
perform functions in differing ways, as a “slogan” that “occupies a highly important
place in our [n]ation’s history and its future”).
23. STAR WARS: EPISODE I—THE PHANTOM MENACE (Lucasfilm 1999); see also
MICHAEL TOMASKY, IF WE CAN KEEP IT: HOW THE REPUBLIC COLLAPSED AND HOW IT
MIGHT BE SAVED 204 (2019) (arguing that unequal representation in the Senate is
“totally indefensible” and has “gotten completely out of hand”). On the transcendent
wisdom of Star Wars, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE WORLD ACCORDING TO STAR WARS xi–
xii (2016).
24. See, e.g., DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 291, 294–95, 297–98, 303–04 (3d
ed. 2006) (arguing for a need for new democratic theories and structures to address
global “disjunctures” and international issues); see also Jan Aart Scholte, Reconstructing
Contemporary Democracy, 15 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 305, 322 (2008) (reviewing
various democratic theories to account for global and “polycentric” governance
needs).
25. Charles Fried agrees that the increase in the Senate’s representation ratio
from around 12:1 to more than 65:1 may seem as if it is “carrying a good joke too
far,” but then defends it. Charles Fried, The Cunning of Reason: Michael Klarman’s The
Framers’ Coup, 116 MICH. L. REV. 981, 997 (2018) (reviewing MICHAEL KLARMAN, THE
FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2016)). Fried
argues that the constitutional structure of the Senate respects “the equal dignity of
even the smallest” states and draws an analogy to the contemporary situation of governing
bodies such as the European Union and the United Nations. Id. at 996–97. As discussed
here, though, the problem becomes one of balancing “equal dignity” of states with “equal
dignity” of citizens. At some point, a rebalancing is needed.
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Commons.” 26 This Article argues that Moynihan was correct—as
Madison was before him. 27 It is time to reform the Senate and put it
on a more equally representative footing with its citizens.
According to conventional wisdom, the Connecticut Compromise,
which established the one state, two senators rule, 28 is so firmly
embedded in the original constitutional framework that it can never
be changed, except by calling a constitutional convention, which has
never been done in the 230-plus years since the founding.29 Some have
proposed other solutions. Former Representative John Dingell has
called for abolition of the Senate.30 Akhil Amar has recommended a
national referendum to call the constitutional question. 31 Burt
Neuborne has suggested dividing large states such as California into

26. LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 11–12 (quoting Moynihan). Prior to the
Great Reform Act of 1832, the British House of Commons severely underrepresented
growing cities and had “rotten boroughs” characterized by very small populations.
See generally ERIC J. EVANS, THE GREAT REFORM ACT OF 1832 6–7 (2d ed. 1994). At one
point before the reform, a majority of representatives in the Commons represented
only 1/170 of the total population. ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE:
REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776–1850 37 (1987).
27. For Madison’s view favoring proportional allocation in the Senate, see supra
note 5.
28. See supra note 5.
29. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 11, 49–53,
174 (2006) (criticizing Senate apportionment as “illegitimate” and arguing for a new
constitutional convention). Constitutional conventions, however, are both difficult
to call and the results difficult to ratify. U.S. CONST. art. V.; see also infra Part I.
30. John D. Dingell, I Served in Congress Longer Than Anyone. Here’s How to Fix It,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018
/12/john-dingell-how-restore-faith-government/577222 [https://perma.cc/XF3L76E8]. In 1911, Representative Victor Berger also proposed abolishing the Senate,
which contributed to the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment mandating
popular elections of senators. See LEVINSON, supra note 29, at 161–62.
31. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1044, 1069–71 (1988); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
457, 459 (1994) (“I believe that Congress would be obliged to call a convention to
propose revisions if a majority of American voters so petition; and that an amendment
or new Constitution could be lawfully ratified by a simple majority of the American
electorate.”). But see Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding,
and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 121–22 (1996) (contesting the
constitutionality of Amar’s approach).
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two or three new states to add senators. 32 Others have said the
Supreme Court should declare the Senate unconstitutional, or that
people should rally for “a revolution, whether bloody or bloodless.” 33
This Article proposes a more moderate, targeted, and practical
solution. Congress should enact a statutory reform of the Senate to
protect “the right to vote” against abridgment by “the United States”
under its powers delegated by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, collectively the votingrights amendments.34 The amendments extend “the equal protection
of the laws” to voting rights for all U.S. citizens, and they guard
specifically against the abridgment of voting rights based on “race” or
“color,” “sex,” and “age.”35 Each of them charges Congress expressly with
“power to enforce [this amendment] by appropriate legislation.” 36
The obvious objection to my proposed reform is that it is impossible
because the Constitution explicitly adopts the one state, two senators
rule, and a mere statute cannot change it. 37 Furthermore, the
Constitution appears to forbid the one state, two senators rule from
ever being amended. Article V provides not only one of the most
restrictive amendment procedures in the world, requiring a twothirds vote of a bicameral Congress and ratification by three-quarters
of the states, but also declares specifically that “no State, without its
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.” 38 Only
one third of senators, currently representing less than eight percent
of the U.S. population—or thirteen state legislatures representing less
than five percent—are sufficient to block any reform by
32. Burt Neuborne, Opinion, Divide States to Democratize the Senate, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 20, 2018, at A15; see also Bouie, supra note 8 (citing a similar proposal by political
scientist David Faris).
33. Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has
Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21, 83 (1997); see also Daniel Lazare, A Constitutional Revolution,
JACOBIN (Jan. 3, 2017), https://jacobinmag.com/2017/01/constitution-trumpdemocracy-electoral-college-senate [https://perma.cc/MH6Z-23PK] (arguing for an
extra-constitutional “constituent assembly” for a revolutionary re-founding of the
nation by “the people”).
34. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
35. Id. amends. XV, § 1; XIX; XXVI, § 1.
36. Id. amends. XIV § 5; XV § 2; XIX; XXIV, § 2; XXVI § 2.
37. Id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII, § 1.
38. Id. art. V; see also Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165,
1166–67 (2014).
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amendment. 39 Arguably at least, no amendment of a state’s “equal
suffrage” can be adopted unless each and every state gives its
“consent.” 40 Leading scholars have therefore declared that changing
the status quo is “unthinkable” 41 or at least “virtually impossible.” 42
Again then, according to the conventional wisdom, our
Constitution traps us in what I will call a Lockean paradox. We may
want to follow the principle that “the people shall choose their
representatives upon just and undeniably equal measures,” but our
own Constitution prevents us from doing so.43 “We the People” seem to
be locked (pun intended) into an undemocratic structure forever by our
revered founding document.44
The primary contribution of this Article is to show “it ain’t necessarily
so.”45 We can resolve our Lockean paradox of Senate representation
39. U.S. States—Ranked by Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REV.,
http://worldpopulationreview.com/states
[https://perma.cc/57ZG-XH9B]
(providing percentages for the calculations).
40. See U.S. CONST. art. V (outlining the procedures for amending the
Constitution).
41. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 103–04 (2010) (“The
requirement of one person, one vote, has compelled states to abolish their own
versions of the Senate . . . . But to interpret the Constitution to require a comparable
change in the Senate is unthinkable.”). Strauss is referring to an unlikely Supreme
Court challenge to the Senate’s constitutionality. See infra Section III.G. He may
remain open to the possibility of a legislative fix as proposed here.
42. DAHL, supra note 9, at 48–49, 144–45 (criticizing the Senate as a dramatic
departure from the principle of democratic equality, but concluding that reform is
“virtually impossible”); TOMASKY, supra note 23, at 205 (criticizing Senate
representation but concluding it is “[s]eemingly impossible” to change); see also
KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 626–27 (recognizing the one state, two senators rule as
severely “undemocratic,” but finding it “expressly rendered unamendable without
the consent of every state,” making it “a truly extraordinary instance of dead-hand
control that we should not expect to see eliminated even if we live a very long time”).
On the meaning of “consent” and “equal suffrage,” see also Section III.C.2.
43. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also LEVINSON, supra note 29, at 21
(observing that “Article V . . . brings us all too close to a Lockean dream (or
nightmare) of changeless stasis”); cf. Michael Steven Green, The Paradox of Auxiliary
Rights: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 52
DUKE L.J. 113, 119–22 (2002) (describing a different kind of “Lockean paradox”
regarding rights of civil disobedience).
44. See LEVINSON, supra note 29, at 21 (describing the nearly impossible
amendment process of the Constitution and its seemingly guaranteed static nature).
45. GEORGE GERSHWIN & IRA GERSHWIN, It Ain’t Necessarily So, in PORGY & BESS
(1935); cf. Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV.
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through a congressional statute closely tailored to the exercise of powers
delegated by the voting-rights amendments to protect U.S. citizens’ equal
rights to vote. Making the Senate more democratic also follows in the
tradition of the Seventeenth Amendment, which has already once
changed the meaning of “equal suffrage” of the states to mean a democratic
popular vote rather than selection of senators by state legislatures.46 The
proposed reform would make the Senate more democratic, once again, by
proportionally adjusting the allocation of senators to the states while at the
same time respecting a constraint of federalism.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes our Lockean
paradox. Part II presents a legislative solution. Congress, acting within its
delegated powers under the voting-rights amendments, should adopt a
statute to reform the distribution of senators. The statute would replace
the one state, two senators rule with one that allocates senators in a
manner that both respects the original commitment to federalism, with at
least one senator to each state, and upholds the rights of U.S. citizens to
participate in their political democracy on a relatively equal basis, with a
greater number of senators allocated to more populous states. I
recommend what I will call the Rule of One Hundred as a formula for
determining this allocation in a process that piggybacks on the use of the
official census conducted every ten years to allocate members of the
House. All other features and functions of the Senate remain the same.
Part III offers a constitutional defense. Contrary to the conventional
view that the number of senators per state is set in stone by the original
constitutional text, I argue that the later voting-rights amendments
delegate power to Congress to contravene the one state, two senators
rule. Textual analysis supports this argument. Congressional action
would create an intratextual constitutional conflict, which I argue
should be resolved in favor of the exercise of congressional power.
Other standard modes of interpretation, including considerations of
structure, history, moral principle, and legal doctrine, support the
reform’s constitutionality.

L. REV. 28, 153 (2004) (“Democratic institutions must be stable enough to provide
relatively fixed frameworks within which organized political competition can take
place but flexible enough to respond to appropriate demands for changes in the way
democracy is practiced and experienced.”); supra text accompanying note 2.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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Two interrelated constitutional arguments justify the reform. First,
it fulfills a congressional mandate to protect the rights of U.S. citizens
to a rough mathematical equality of voting weight in their national
government—within a federalism constraint. This argument extends
the same principle of equal voting rights to the U.S. Senate that the
Supreme Court followed in cases such as Reynolds v. Sims 47 to strike
down similarly unequal state legislatures. 48 Protection of the equal
voting rights of U.S. citizens in general is one sufficient justification
for congressional reform under the Fourteenth Amendment. 49
Second, unequal representation in the Senate violates the equal voting
rights of specifically protected categories of citizens. Most egregiously,
empirical research shows that “whites . . . constitute the only [racial or
ethnic] group that Senate apportionment advantages.”50 Even though the
median distribution of white citizens in the United States is
47. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
48. See id. at 568; infra Section III.G.
49. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (per curiam) (striking down
unequal treatment of citizens in a presidential recount under the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Pildes, supra note 45, at 48 (arguing that Bush v. Gore established
“an individual right to an equally weighted vote” in federal elections); cf. Laurence
H. Tribe, eroG .v hsuB and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115
HARV. L. REV. 170, 221–22, 269 (2001) (arguing that the Court’s equal protection
theories were empty and based on various “shell game[s],” but noting that “the day
might yet come when a pearl is drawn from that oyster”).
50. LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 21; see also Griffin, supra note 21, at 406
(finding that African Americans and Latinos reside disproportionately in states with
less voting weight); Neil Malhotra & Connor Raso, Racial Representation and U.S. Senate
Apportionment, 88 SOC. SCI. Q. 1038, 1045 (2007) (finding “both African Americans
and Hispanics are substantially underrepresented” in the Senate “due to their greater
presence in high-population states as compared to in low-population states,” and
predicting this bias with respect to Hispanic populations will increase over the next
few decades); cf. John D. Griffin & Michael Keane, Are African Americans Effectively
Represented in Congress?, 64 POL. RES. Q. 145, 145 (2011) (finding less effective
representation on most standard measures).
The idea of “white” people is, of course, a social, political, and legal construct, but
one that continues to have pernicious effects. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE xxi-xxii (rev. ed. 2006); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS,
FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY x (2011) (“Contrary to popular misconception, we are not
naturally divided into genetically identifiable racial groups. Biologically, there is one
human race. Race applied to human beings is a political division: it is a system of
governing people that classifies them into a social hierarchy based on invented
biological demarcations.”).

1994

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1981

approximately 61 percent, for example, the most populous state of
California is only 38 percent white, and second-most-populous Texas is
43 percent white. 51 Many small states are disproportionately white,
including the two smallest states of Vermont (96 percent) and
Wyoming (84 percent). 52 It therefore does not go too far to describe
the current apportionment of the Senate as a vehicle for entrenching
white supremacy. 53 Other statistically smaller inequalities appear with
respect to sex, age, and other protected categories.54 Protecting the equal
voting rights of these citizens supplies another constitutional justification for
the reform.
The statutory reform is narrowly tailored to vindicate the promise
of equal voting rights in the national polity. It follows the political theories
of both Locke and Madison—as well as later constitutional theorists such
as Frederick Douglass, who helped to make the expansion of equal voting
rights a central narrative in American history.55

51. See WORLD POPULATION REV., supra note 39 (outlining state populations); infra
Table 4.
52. See WORLD POPULATION REV., supra note 39 (outlining the population of the
states); infra Table 4.
53. See TUCKER, supra note 7, at 16 (“Through the institution of the Senate, the
foundational document of the United States entrenches white rule . . . .”). An earlier
version of my conclusion was criticized as assuming that all whites are racist, but the
critic misses the point. David Marcus, No, Senate Apportionment Is Not White Supremacy,
FEDERALIST (Jan. 4, 2019), https://thefederalist.com/2019/01/04/no-senateapportionment-not-white-supremacy
[https://perma.cc/ZZ7G-NM46].
My
argument is instead that a Senate imbalance favoring whites significantly over other
racial and ethnic groups increases the leverage that white citizens can use to entrench
superior positions of power that have been historically inherited. This is a broad use
of the term “white supremacy” to mean “a political, economic and cultural system in
which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious and
unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations
of white dominance and nonwhite subordination are daily reenacted across a broad
array of institutions and social settings”—as distinguished from a “narrow” use
meaning only “the self-conscious racism of white supremacist hate groups.” Vann R.
Newkirk II, The Language of White Supremacy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/the-language-of-whitesupremacy/542148 [https://perma.cc/SH63-RQZ7] (quoting Frances Lee Ansley);
see also supra note 46.
54. See infra Tables 1 & 4.
55. See supra notes 1 & 5 and accompanying text; see also DAVID W. BLIGHT,
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PROPHET OF FREEDOM xv, xx, 428, 454–55, 483 (2018)
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The reform would also bring several structural co-benefits. 56 First,
it would address a widespread concern with the unrepresentativeness
of the Electoral College without the need to move to a national
popular vote as a solution. 57 Second, it would make tractable the
problem of underrepresentation of citizens in the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and elsewhere by making statehood
politically easier to accomplish. 58 Third, the reform would reduce
long-term potential political pressures for secession, especially in
large states such as California or Texas, which might otherwise build
from unhappiness about unfair representation. 59 The reform would
promote stability as well as fairness.
Part IV presents an argument that the reform is politically balanced
and may well prove feasible, perhaps even attracting bipartisan
support. I conclude that adoption of the reform would enhance the
greatness of American-style democracy.
I. OUR LOCKEAN PARADOX OF SENATE REPRESENTATION
At the dawn of limited constitutional government, John Locke
recognized that a paradox can arise with respect to representative
legal structures. The creation of legislatures to represent “the people”
in government requires the designation of districts from which the
legislators would hail, but the underlying features of these districts
would then change over time, thus throwing the original scheme out
of whack. 60 In Locke’s words,

(describing Douglass as “a serious constitutional thinker” focused on establishing the
right to vote for black Americans). On Locke’s political theory, see also infra Part I.
56. See infra Section III.D.
57. See Steven Shepard, Poll: Voters Prefer Popular Vote Over Electoral College,
POLITICO (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/27/pollpopular -vote-electoral-college-1238346 [https://perma.cc/5PLE-MVA8]; see also
infra Section III.D.8.
58. See TUCKER, supra note 7, at 17 (outlining the lack of representation for large
swaths of the country including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and U.S.
territories); see also infra Section III.D.7.
59. See infra Section III.D.5 (discussing the dangers of political unrest in states
with underrepresented populations).
60. See LOCKE, supra note 1, § 157, at 89.
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Things of this world are in so constant a flux that nothing remains
long in the same state. Thus people, riches, trade, power change
their stations, flourishing mighty cities come to ruin and prove in
time neglected, desolate corners, while other unfrequented places
grow into populous countries, filled with wealth and inhabitants.
But things not always changing equally, . . . it often comes to pass
that in governments where part of the legislative consists of
representatives chosen by the people, that in tract of time this
representation becomes very unequal and disproportionate to the
reasons it was at first established upon. 61

Locke gave the example of a town that had fallen into “ruin” with a
remaining population of only a shepherd and some sheep, but it
maintained representation in the legislature equivalent to “a whole
county numerous in people and powerful in riches.” 62 This “rotten
boroughs” problem eventually produced a situation in which only 1/170
of the total population accounted for a majority of representatives in the
House of Commons.63
Locke’s solution to this paradox of representation was, in a system
with no written constitution, to allow the monarch or executive power
to correct the representational imbalance. 64 Even though “the
legislative is the supreme power,” 65 Locke argued that the executive
should step in to “rectif[y] the disorders” and correct the
representational discrepancy “not by old custom but true reason,”
allocating “the number of all members in all places that have a right
to be distinctly represented.” 66 For Locke, this extra-legislative action
would “justify itself” by its end and not its means. 67 For “whenever the
people shall choose their representatives upon just and undeniably
equal measures, suitable to the original frame of government, it
cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society, whoever
permitted or caused them so to do.” 68
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See supra note 26; see also TOMASKY, supra note 23, at 8–9 (describing this
problem and noting that Madison was aware of the danger of recreating “rotten
boroughs”).
64. LOCKE, supra note 1, § 158, at 90.
65. Id. § 150, at 85.
66. Id. § 158, at 90.
67. Id. § 158, at 90–91.
68. Id. § 158, at 91; supra text accompanying note 1.
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Eventually, the British Parliament itself addressed the problem
through a series of Reform Acts over the course of the nineteenth
century. 69 In Britain, “[t]he constitution was not a set of documents
but a reading of history.” 70 Although pressures of custom and
tradition impeded change, no constitutional text blocked reform. 71
Locke, as well as Hobbes and Montesquieu, heavily influenced the
American constitutional founders, including Madison. 72 Although
Locke was one of the most original and influential theorists of limited
constitutional government, he was not a democratic theorist in the
contemporary sense of believing in a broadly defined and wide-ranging
franchise.73 Nevertheless, the representation paradox that Locke
identified appears again in the form of the contemporary U.S. Senate.
The Senate today presents an analogous Lockean paradox: a
legislature growing increasingly disproportionate in its representation
and yet bound against change by tradition and custom—
compounded by the fact of a written constitution with extraordinarily
rigorous constraints on its amendment. 74 The U.S. Constitution is the
first and oldest of its kind. 75 No previous national government relied on
a written constitution, and the U.S. example has since been followed by

69. See Robert Saunders, Parliament and People: The British Constitution in the Long
Nineteenth Century, 6 J. MOD. EUR. HIST. 72, 72–73 (2008) (describing these reforms
and expansions of the franchise).
70. Id. at 76.
71. Note, however, that the British House of Lords, though weakened in recent
years, continues to exercise an undemocratic power of delay. See Meg Russell, Attempts
to Change the British House of Lords into a Second Chamber of the Nations and Regions:
Explaining a History of Failed Reforms, 10 PERSP. ON FED. 268, 273 (2018).
72. HELD, supra note 24, at 70–71; see also James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy
and Elections: Implementing Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT.
L. REV. 189, 212–13 (1990) (describing the Lockean influence on the Constitution
and the reflection of Lockean theory in its popular sovereignty roots).
73. HELD, supra note 24, at 59, 62–65. Locke was one of the last influential
political theorists to justify the institution of slavery as a relationship existing outside
of civil society. DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION, 1770–1823 45 (1999) (“John Locke, the great enemy of all absolute and
arbitrary power, was the last major philosopher to see a justification for absolute and
perpetual slavery.”).
74. See LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 223–30 (diagnosing the problem
though not suggesting a reform).
75. Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1642 (2014).
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many other countries.76 Article V is the key provision that allows the
Constitution to evolve slowly with changing times, but it is much stricter
than the amending clauses of any other national written constitution.77
Finding a solution to the paradox of Senate representation is
daunting. First, Article V explicitly forbids any interference with “equal
suffrage” of the states without the “consent” of each state. 78 One
proposed reform has argued nonetheless for a two-step approach
around the problem: first eliminate the Equal Suffrage Clause by
amendment, and then amend Article V to eliminate or reform the
Senate. 79 This approach cannot dodge the Lockean paradox, however,
because it is extremely unlikely that two thirds of both the House and
the Senate and three quarters of the states would agree to amendments
that would reduce the relative voting power of senators from small
states. 80 For similar reasons, a constitutional convention, subject to
the same super-majority constraints, is a non-starter. 81 Hence our
Lockean paradox: our government purports to be “of the people, by
the people, [and] for the people,” 82 yet our Senate has grown in the
flux of time to be increasingly unequally representative of “We the
People.” 83

76. Id. at 1642–43. In substance, however, the influence of U.S. constitutionalism
is waning globally. Id.; see also David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of
the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2012) (comparing differences
among national written constitutions).
77. Huq, supra note 38, at 1166 & n.1 (highlighting the consensus that Article V
tremendously impedes any chance of constitutional revision or amendment, more
than similar provisions in other national constitutions).
78. U.S. CONST. art. V.
79. Scott J. Bowman, Note, Wild Political Dreaming: Constitutional Reformation of the
United States Senate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2004).
80. U.S. CONST. art. V; see also supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
81. See U.S. CONST. art. V; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
82. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in ROY P. BASLER,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 734 (1946).
83. U.S. CONST. pmbl. As one scholar has argued, the idea of an unamendable
constitutional provision is inherently “undemocratic.” See Yaniv Roznai, Necrocracy or
Democracy? Assessing Objections to Constitutional Unamendability, 68 IUS GENTIUM 29, 36–
39 (2018). He coins the term “necrocracy” to describe this kind of dead-hand
control. Id. As G.K. Chesterton also quipped: “Tradition may be defined as the
extension of the franchise. Tradition means giving votes to the most obscure of all
classes, our ancestors. It is the democracy of the dead.” ASTRA TAYLOR, DEMOCRACY
MAY NOT EXIST, BUT WE’LL MISS IT WHEN IT’S GONE 281 (2019) (quoting Chesterton).
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The solution to our Lockean paradox is for Congress to cut the
Gordian knot. 84 As Lisa Disch has argued, elaborating on an idea first
articulated by Hannah Pitkin, representatives in democratic
governments act within a “constituency paradox” in which they both
reflect the identities, interests, and views of those who elect them, and
at the same time compose their constituents’ identities, interests, and
views. 85 By enacting the proposed reform, Congress would both
embrace the Lockean paradox and resolve it. Oriented toward an
understanding of the polity and the need to rectify its representational
structure, Congress would act in its role as representatives of its current
constituents, namely, “the People.” Congressional legislation is the best
and most democratic course of action short of out-and-out revolution to
resolve our Lockean paradox.86
II. PROPOSAL FOR A SENATE REFORM ACT
The proposed reform draws on a number of principles expressed
in the Constitution, including federalism and equal voting rights, to
recommend a congressional statute to put the Senate on a more
democratic foundation. Call it the Senate Reform Act. 87 Here is how
it would work.
The reform mandates a minimum of one senator for each state. It
departs from the original one state, two senators rule, however, and
allocates more senators to more populous states, following the
constitutional principle of equal voting rights. In technical terms, this
84. According to myth, Alexander the Great, when confronted with the difficult
knot at Gordium in Phrygia that would allow him to lay claim to the kingdom and all
of Asia beyond it, simply declared that “it makes no difference” how the knot is
untied, and he sliced it with one blow from his sword. Evan Andrews, What Was the
Gordian Knot?, HIST. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/what-was-thegordian-knot [https://perma.cc/C7XE-SN3Z].
85. Lisa Disch, Democratic Representation and the Constituency Paradox, 10 PERSP. ON
POL. 599, 601–05 (2012); see also TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 11 (describing democracy
as a “balance of paradoxes” including the one associated with Jean Jacques Rousseau
of “what comes first: the society and institutions that mold democratic citizens,
cultivating and educating them, or citizens who are capable of creating such societies
and institutions?”).
86. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
87. Or, if you prefer a catchier acronym: the Sanely Ordered Senate (“SOS”) Act
or Simple Arithmetic for Voter Equality (“SAVE”) Act. Thanks to Julian Jonker for
these suggestions.
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structure is known as degressive proportionality, which balances the
democratic principle of one person, one vote with a need in
federalism to allocate a representational minimum to subsidiary or
secondary political entities such as states. 88 In other words, the
proposed reform recognizes the legitimacy of representation of the
states as independent units within the larger federal system, but
rebalances the relative weight given to citizens within these units.
Since the admission of Alaska and Hawaii in 1959, the United States
has been comprised of fifty states. Because the Senate has consisted
of one hundred members for so long, the proposal begins with this
number as a guideline. Plus, it is easy to do the math and therefore
easy for citizens, as well as politicians, to understand.
Since 1790, an official census of the population has been conducted
every ten years in order to determine allocations of House members. 89
With a nod to federalism, the Constitution allocates at least one
representative to each state even if its population falls below the total
population of the country divided by 435—a number that has been set
by statute on a semi-permanent basis since 1911.90 The decennial census
also forms the basis for the proposal here.
First, calculate the number and allocation of senators as follows. Start
with the total U.S. population. For 2017, this number is 325,719,178.91 I
use this number as an illustration, though of course it will be somewhat
higher in the next official census in 2020.
Second, divide this number by one hundred. This gives the unit to be
used to allocate seats to each state. Call this the Rule of One Hundred.
In the illustration, each senate unit for a seat equals 3,257,192 people.
88. See, e.g., Yukio Koriyama et al., Optimal Apportionment, 121 J. POL. ECON. 584,
585, 589–90 (2013) (describing degressive proportionality). This approach is also
used in other representational situations. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see also Agency History, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/history/www/census_then_now [https://perma.cc/VGL5UJA4] (last modified May 30, 2019).
90. Jeffrey W. Ladewig, One Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate Malapportionment
and Constitutional Requirements, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1127–28 (2011).
91. Annual Estimates of the Residential Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2017, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU: AM. FACT FINDER, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/table services
/jsf/pages/product.view.xhtml [https://perma.cc/82MN-5B7M]. For continuing
updates on current estimates of U.S. population, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK
FACTS,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218
[https:
//perma.cc/B9D9-UY5A].
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Third, compare seat allocation units with the populations of each
state as determined by the decennial census. Following the principle
of federalism used also by the House, each state receives at least one
senator. For more populous states, the number of senators is equal
to the number of units determined by the Rule of One Hundred.
A state with less than or approximately one senate unit gets one
senator. States with twice as many get two senators, states with three
times as many get three, and so on.
See Table 1 on the next page for an allocation of senators based on
the 2017 census estimate. One may assume it would be generally the
same if the proposal were adopted following the 2020 census.
This reform, as shown, corrects the massive underrepresentation of
some states. California, the most populous state, is allocated twelve
senators—showing the dramatic current underrepresentation of citizens
in this state. Texas is allocated nine senators. Florida and New York get six.
Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania receive four. States that each gain a
senator are Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia.
Twelve states hold steady at the original number of two senators.
Twenty-six states lose a senator—though some of these are still
overrepresented from a purely mathematical perspective.
Eleven of the smallest states count less than one-half of a Rule of One
Hundred unit (i.e., less than .05/100 of the population). All states
continue to be entitled to one senator following general principles of
federalism and “equal suffrage in the Senate.”92
The total generated in the illustration is 110 senators. The reform
would follow similar procedures as the House and adjust allocations
going forward according to the decennial census: first the 2020
census, with reallocations in 2030, 2040, et cetera.

92. U.S. CONST. art. V; see also infra Section III.C.2.
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Table 1: Proposed Allocation of Senators under a Senate Reform Act
State
United States
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico

2017 Population*
325,719,178
4,874,747
739,795
7,016,270
3,004,279
39,536,653
5,607,154
3,588,184
961,939
20,984,400
10,429,379
1,427,538
1,716,943
12,802,023
6,666,818
3,145,711
2,913,123
4,454,189
4,684,333
1,335,907
6,052,177
6,859,819
9,962,311
5,576,606
2,984,100
6,113,532
1,050,493
1,920,076
2,998,039
1,342,795
9,005,644
2,088,070

Share of One
Percent of
Total U.S.
Population

Proposed
Senators

1.49**
.23
2.15
.92
12.13
1.72
1.10
.30
6.44
3.20
.44
.53
3.93
2.05
.97
.89
1.37
1.44
.41
1.86
2.11
3.06
1.71
.92
1.88
.32
.59
.92
.41
2.76
.64

2
1
2
1
12
2
1
1
6
3
1
1
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
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New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total Senators
District of
Columbia
Puerto Rico
Pacific Islands †
American Indians
and Alaskan
Natives ††

19,849,399
10,273,419
755,393
11,658,609
3,930,864
4,142,776
12,805,537
1,059,639
5,024,369
869,666
6,715,984
28,304,596
3,101,833
623,657
8,470,020
7,405,743
1,815,857
5,795,483
579,315

6.09
3.15
.23
3.58
1.21
1.27
3.93
.33
1.54**
.27
2.06
8.69
.95
.19
2.60
2.27
.56
1.78
.18

693,972

.21

6
3
1
4
1
1
4
1
2
1
2
9
1
1
3
2
1
2
1
110
(1)

3,337,177
375,165
2,726,278

1.02
.11
.73

(1)
(1)
(1)

* U.S. Census, 2017 estimate, used for illustration purposes only.
** In borderline cases, I err in favor of greater representation and round up. I
thus generally follow a mathematical method of “equal proportions” looking at .50
as the dividing line, but actual adoption of this approach would have to grapple
politically with different mathematical line-drawing options. See, e.g., Walter F.
Willcox, Last Words on the Apportionment Problem, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 290
(1952) (discussing various other options including “rejected fractions” and “included
fractions”).
† U.S. Census data for 2010 combined for American Samoa (55,519), Guam
(159,358), North Mariana Islands (53,883), and the U.S. Virgin Islands (106,405).
†† U.S. Census, 2017 estimate, total in the territory of U.S. states.
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A grandparent provision could allow senators to continue serving
their full terms. If the proposed statute went into effect, for example,
and a small state had two senators with four and six years remaining
in their respective terms, they would continue in office until one term
expired. In a state allocated only one seat, the senator whose term
first ends would become ineligible for another term, and the seat
would be retired. In Vermont, for example, Senator Bernie Sanders
was re-elected in 2018, and Senator Patrick Leahy’s term ends in 2022.
If a Senate Reform Act were adopted in 2020, Senator Leahy’s seat
would be retired in 2022.
Statutory provisions would adhere to the Three Classes Clause that
divides senators in order to balance the six-year terms. 93 See Table 2
on the next page. 94 How and when to add senators would be subject
to negotiation when adopting the statute—with an objective of
maintaining an even balance. As in the original scheme, additions of
new senators to each of the three classes would be determined by lot
or coin toss. 95 See Table 3 on page 2006. States allocated three or
more senators would have elections every two years. In Texas, for
example, three senators would be elected every two years.
Adding senators would be calibrated to the three classes. If a state
gets three senators, then a new senator would be added when an open
class slot for the state becomes available. For example, Michigan has
Class 1 and 2 senators, and so it would add a Class 3 senator in 2022.
This process would also allow for a relatively gradual transition from
the current status quo to the new representative structure, thus
providing institutional stability while making the change.

93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (providing senators “shall be divided as equally as
may be into three Classes . . . so that one third may be chosen every second Year”);
see infra Table 2.
94. See U.S. Senate Election Guidebook 3–14 (2010) (used to compile Table 2).
95. See infra Table 3; see also Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 17–21, 24–26 (2009) (describing the prevailing justifications
for randomized judicial decisions such as lotteries and coin flips).
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Table 2: The Three Classes of Senators by State
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

Class 1
X

Class 2
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Class 3

X
X

X
X
X
X
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Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Table 3: Allocations of Senators over Time*
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana

2020 [2]
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

2022 [3]
2
2
2
1
4**
2
1
2
4**
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1

2024 [1]
2
2
2
1
8**
2
1
1
5**
3
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
1

2026
2
1
2
1
12**
2
1
1
6**
3
1
1
4**
2
1
1
1
1

2019]
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

2
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
3
2
4**
2
1
3**
1
1
3**
2
2
1
2
4**
1
1
3
2
2
2
2

2007
1
2
2
3
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
5**
2
1
4**
1
1
4**
1
2
1
2
7**
1
1
3
2
1
2
1

1
2
2
3
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
6**
3
1
4
1
1
4
1
2
1
2
9**
1
1
3
2
1
2
1

* Brackets after years indicates senate class up for election. Additions are correlated
with openings in classes for states, and losses with expiration of terms.
** Indicates choice of classes to be made by lot drawn with other states.
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Allocation of multiple senators to more populous states may allow for
experimentation to enhance representative democracy and to moderate
political polarization. For example, states could follow a process similar to
the one used in California’s open primary to select the top vote-getters to
serve in the available seats—e.g., four senators in each biennial election in
California under the proposed reform.96 At least in theory, top-vote open
primary elections would reduce political polarization, given that parties
could win an election by coming in second, third in Texas, or even fourth
in California, rather than the current winner-take-all tournaments.97
Instant runoff elections provide another option. In instant runoffs,
voters rank their top candidates of any party, bypassing primaries, and
the top vote-getters win.98 In Texas, for example, one might imagine a
future top-choice instant runoff in which citizens would elect a
Republican, a Democrat, and maybe a Libertarian as three of their nine
senators (e.g., Ted Cruz and Beto O’Rourke plus one, if the scheme had
been in effect in 2018).
In yet another option, states might divide themselves into different senate
districts, as they do for the House.99 Congress or state governments,
96. California adopted a “top-two” election structure using an open primary in
2012. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 301–02 (2011). The two winners of the
open primary compete against each other in the general election, even if they hail
from the same political party. Id. Washington adopted a version of this system too,
and it survived a constitutional challenge. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 444, 459 (2008). The Court emphasized that states
possess a “broad power to prescribe the ‘Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives’” under the Constitution. Id. at 451
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1). Under the same provision, Congress can
prescribe the “manner” of elections, so Congress could itself mandate top-vote or
other electoral options in large states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also Rucho v.
Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495–96 (2019) (describing how state legislators are
“checked and balanced” by Congress acting under the authority of the Elections
Clause).
97. Cf. Pildes, supra note 96, at 307 (finding alternatives to closed primaries to be
“the single most discrete institutional change” likely to reduce political polarization).
98. Id. at 303–04 (praising instant runoff voting). But see James P. Langan, Note,
Instant Runoff Voting: A Cure That is Likely Worse than the Disease, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1569, 1570–71 (2005) (worrying that instant runoffs can cause “confusion,
uncertainty, and instability”).
99. See Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sovereignty of the People: The Case for Senate
Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1996) (arguing the Seventeenth Amendment allows
for the creation of senate districts). Senate districts in big states would achieve the
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however, should guard against the partisan gerrymandering that infects
current legislative redistricting.100 Congress may charge an independent
bipartisan commission to apportion senate districts, “an avenue of reform”
recognized recently by the Supreme Court.101 California’s approach
appears to be a leader in the field.102
New states would get senators according to the same calculus. 103
The District of Columbia and Puerto Rico would qualify, if admitted, for
one senator each. The Pacific Islands taken together might compose the
newest, smallest state. Indigenous peoples might also qualify to petition
for statehood, if they wished. 104
same aim as proposed reforms that would split big states into smaller new ones
without the transaction costs of building new administrative infrastructure of entire
states. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing Burt Neuborne’s
proposal).
100. See Pildes, supra note 45, at 61 (describing prevalence of partisan
gerrymandering). The Supreme Court recently declined to exercise jurisdiction to
review the constitutionality of even the most extreme forms of partisan
gerrymandering. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–08.
Note that bipartisan “sweetheart” gerrymandering by incumbents from different
parties is “emerging as a new, equally serious but different kind of threat to American
democracy.” Pildes, supra note 45, at 61–63 (equating bipartisan gerrymandering to
“barons dividing up fiefdoms” instead of “democratically accountable
representatives”).
101. See Richard L. Hasen, The House Democrats’ Colossal Election Reform Bill Could
Save American Democracy, SLATE (Jan. 14, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics
/2019/01/nancy-pelosi-election-reform-bill-save-democracy.html
[https://perma.cc/92GK-6N6G] (noting the “For the People” bill introduced in the
House would mandate “independent redistricting commissions”); see also Catie
Edmondson, Democrats’ For the People Act Passes House, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2019, at A11
(describing that the bill passed the House, but is unlikely to pass through Senate);
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508 (citing bills introduced every year since 2005 for a federal
Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act that would “require every State to
establish an independent commission to adopt redistricting plans” as an available
constitutional “avenue for reform”).
102. See Angelo N. Ancheta, Redistricting Reform and the California Citizens
Redistricting Commission, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 140 (2014) (arguing that the
California Redistricting Commission “demonstrated that redistricting models
designed to limit legislative self-interest and to increase citizen involvement can be
successful” through transparency, public participation, and following legal
priorities).
103. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (describing the constitutional procedure for
admitting new states to the union).
104. See supra Table 1. A proposal has been made, for example, to recognize the
Navajo Nation, and perhaps other indigenous groups, with statehood or the
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III. CONSTITUTIONALITY
If a Senate Reform Act is adopted, then one or more states losing a
senator would likely challenge it as unconstitutional, given that it flies
in the face of the plain meaning of the one state, two senators rule in
the original constitutional text. 105 The Supreme Court may exert its
original jurisdiction. 106 At the outset, however, it is unclear whether
the Court should exercise its discretion to hear the case.
A. Deference to Congress
The reform addresses a “political question” regarding democratic
representation of “We the People,” and the Court should arguably
defer to the political branches of Congress and the President on the
issue, and decline to recognize standing. As the Court recently stated,
when a “question is entrusted to one of the political branches,” then “the
claim is said to present a ‘political question’ and to be nonjusticiable—
outside the courts’ competence and therefore beyond the courts’
jurisdiction.”107 The reform is not an ordinary statute, but rather one

equivalent. TUCKER, supra note 7, at 19. The Cherokee and the Choctaw can claim
treaty rights to congressional delegates that might be upgraded to statehood as well.
Tristan Ahtone, The Cherokee Nation Is Entitled to a Delegate in Congress. But Will They
Finally Send One? YES! MAG. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.yesmagazine.org/peoplepower/the-cherokee-nation-is-entitled-to-a-delegate-in-congress-but-will-they-finallysend-one-20170104 [https://perma.cc/H6DV-GDY4]; cf. Rebecca Tsosie, The Politics
of Inclusion: Indigenous Peoples and U.S. Citizenship, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1692, 1692 (2016)
(discussing different frames of citizenship for indigenous Americans). Note that the
kingdom of Hawaii was first recognized as an independent country before being
annexed as a U.S. state against the preferences of Native Hawaiians. Id. at 1705–06,
1712. Native American landholdings in the contiguous states reached their lowest
point in the 1960s, but increased by fifteen percent to fifty-eight million acres by 2005.
See CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 207
(2005).
105. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1184 (1989) (arguing that interpretation should “adhere closely to the plain meaning
of a text”); Frederick Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV.
41, 47, 48 (1987) (arguing for “taking text seriously”).
106. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
107. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019) (first quoting Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion); and then quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)); see also Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question”
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 599 (1976) (“[A] political question is one in which the
courts forego their unique and paramount function of judicial review of
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that restructures the Senate by exercising the constitutional power
delegated to Congress under the voting-rights amendments. At a
minimum, the Court should give Congress the benefit of the doubt.
The Court might even revive “the rule of clear mistake” from an era
of less active judicial review. 108 Following this rule “would presume
that legislators had found the legislation that they enacted to be
constitutionally permissible and would hold such legislation
unconstitutional only if the legislature had made a ‘clear mistake’ in
constitutional reasoning.” 109
From a political theory and public-facing standpoint as well, it would
be ironic for nine unelected justices to strike down a congressional
statute designed to enhance democratic representation, including fair
representation of people of color, based on an interpretation of the
original text of a 230-year-old document written by white men, of white
men, and, in large part, for white men (many of them slaveholders). 110

constitutionality.”); Note, Political Questions, Public Rights, and Sovereign Immunity, 130
HARV. L. REV. 723, 726 (2016) (arguing in favor of “the classical political question
doctrine”).
108. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 159–
60 (2018) (describing this doctrine of deference).
109. Id. at 160. This approach would allow the Court to exert jurisdiction, thus
preserving its ability to check potential abuses of the Congress making rules for itself,
and at the same time recognize the unusual challenge posed by this reform and giving
deference to Congress when its actions are supported by solid evidence as well as
delegated constitutional power. See Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled Constitution,
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1325, 1332 & n.13 (2018) (describing the principle of “clear
mistake”) (citing James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893)); cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 537–38 (2012) (expressing something close to a clear mistake
doctrine in articulating “a general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s
elected leaders” and asserting that “we strike down an Act of Congress only if ‘the
lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question is clearly demonstrated’”)
(quoting United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883)).
Deference to Congress in this situation may also find analogous support in the
“Thayerism” invoked to defer to the President in areas of decision-making when
“justice and right” may “operate in a different register from legality.” Daphna Renan,
Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2271–72 (2018) (quoting
James Thayer who said “a court should not strike down a law unless its
unconstitutionality is ‘so clear that it is not open to rational question’”).
110. As Stephen Douglas argued in 1858: “This Government was made by our
fathers on the white basis . . . . It was made by white men for the benefit of white men
and their posterity forever.” Jill Lepore, A New Americanism: Why a Nation Needs a
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Doing so would likely put in question the Court’s political legitimacy. 111
It would also risk a strong and justified response from the politically
elected branches. 112 One may also view the enactment of a Senate
Reform Act as an exercise in “popular constitutionalism” and, if so, cast
suspicion on the use of “judicial supremacy” to overturn it.113
National Story, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2019, at 10, 14 (quoting Douglas). Of the
“homogenous collection” of the fifty-five founders: “They were all white, they were
all Protestant, they were all comparatively well-off property owners, and they were all
men.” Schauer, supra note 105, at 41. Twenty-five were slaveholders, and almost all
either owned slaves or participated in the slave trade. Sixteen founders from
southern states depended on slave plantations as their principal means of income.
BEEMAN, supra note 4, at 67–68. Only three founders (including Benjamin Franklin)
belonged to abolition societies. ANDREW DELBANCO, THE WAR BEFORE THE WAR:
FUGITIVE SLAVES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICA’S SOUL FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR 66 (2018). Some of the most prominent founders who owned slaves
included James Madison (who sold a slave to buy books on political philosophy),
Thomas Jefferson (who fathered six children with one of his slaves, Sally Hemmings),
and George Washington (who with his wife owned about 300 slaves and refused even
to free his share of them at his death). Id. at 18, 33, 50–52, 64, 99–100; JILL LEPORE,
THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 94, 106, 147, 173–76 (2018). One
slave escaped from Washington to join the British army during the Revolution.
Another ran away from Madison during the Constitutional Convention. LEPORE,
supra, at 94, 104, 125. It is therefore not surprising that the original Constitution
strongly favored slavery. PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND
LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 6–9 (2d ed. 2001) (listing five clauses protecting
slavery and many indirect protections).
111. See FALLON, supra note 108, at 155–65 (warning the Supreme Court has been
losing public legitimacy and should consider exercising greater judicial restraint
before overturning congressional statutes); see also Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher
D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American
Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184 (2013) (finding a correlation between public legitimacy
and ideological perceptions).
112. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four:
Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 973–79 (2000) (examining the threat from an
unhappy public and noting court-packing may supply an effective response); see also
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–4 (2009).
113. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 248 (2004) (“The Supreme Court is not the highest authority in
the land on constitutional law. We are.”); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000
Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 162–65 (2001) (explaining “popular
constitutionalism” as “a domain in which the people are free to settle questions of
constitutional law by and for themselves in politics” instead of relying on “judicial
supremacy”). One should recognize, however, that popular constitutionalism can
swing in racist and nativist directions. See Ariela Gross, When Is the Time of Slavery? The
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B. The One State, Two Senators Rule
On the assumption that the Court would exert judicial review, it may
initially seem that the objecting states might easily and quickly prevail. 114
The text of the Constitution says the “Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State.”115 More text supports the
argument that the rule is unassailable. The Seventeenth Amendment,
which established that senators must be “elected by the people” rather
than selected by state legislatures, repeats the basic rule.116 Article V adds
an apparent showstopper that seems to protect the rule from any change
whatsoever—even by constitutional amendment.
Immediately
following a clause saying no amendment may interfere with the slave
trade until 1808, Article V states that “no State, without its Consent,
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate”—with no
expiration date. 117
Given the plain meaning of these provisions, it may seem that
abrogating the one state, two senators rule is indeed “unthinkable,” 118
even if several legal scholars believe it to be “the stupidest part of the
Constitution” or “one of the stupidest.” 119 According to the
traditional view, Congress cannot change the number of senators per
state. To try to do so, one might argue, would be the equivalent of
Congress trying to lower the minimum age required to serve as
president. The text says that the president must “have attained to the

History of Slavery in Contemporary Legal and Political Argument, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 283,
318–20 (2008) (recounting pro-slavery versions of popular constitutionalism).
114. Citizens, the Congress, and the President should also ask themselves whether
the proposed reform is constitutional. Cf. FALLON, supra note 108, at 115 (describing
“departmentalism” that holds different parts of government should exercise
independent views about constitutionality of actions); KRAMER, supra note 113, at
106–09 (describing “departmental theory” in similar terms).
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
116. Id. amend. XVII.
117. Id. art. V.
118. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
119. LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Constitutional Stupidities Symposium, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 139–226 (1995)); see
also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The One Senator, One Vote Clause, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
159, 161–62 (1995) (calling the one state, two senators rule “the most problematic in
the Constitution” because it is “anti-democratic” and privileges the “sagebrush” values
of small states, but agreeing that it “cannot be ameliorated by conventional
interpretive or practical mechanisms”).
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Age of thirty five years.” 120 If Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who became
the youngest U.S. Representative in history at age twenty-nine,
decided to run for president in 2020, one could not say that the
meaning of age has changed, or complain that age qualifications had
been written by dead white men.121 The text establishing the one state,
two senators rule—the argument would go—is as clear as the text
regarding age qualifications, allowing no room for debate.
However, it is not only possible to think that a Senate Reform Act can
pass constitutional muster, but the much better argument—deriving
even from “the sanctity of the text”—favors this finding.122 We should also
guard against a propensity to treat text “as too sacred to be touched.”123
In advancing an argument in favor of constitutionality, this Article
follows traditional modes of interpretation: “text, structure, history,
ethos, and doctrine.”124 These “modes or facets of constitutional
interpretation” are in practice intertwined.125 If interpretive modes
conflict, then one must weigh their values against each other. 126 In
120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
121. Li Zhou, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Is Now the Youngest Woman Elected to Congress,
VOX (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/6/18070704/election-resultsalexandria-ocasio-cortez-wins [https://perma.cc/R3KR-GZN8]; see also Frederick
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CALIF. L. REV. 399, 414 (1985) (arguing that is it an “easy
case” that “a twenty-nine year-old is not going to be President of the United States”).
122. STRAUSS, supra note 41, at 102–03.
123. KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 631 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
124. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 85 (3d ed. 2000); see
also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1, 12–13 (1991) (describing
“constitutional modalities” including historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, moral,
and prudential); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1st ed. 2004) (noting that
interpretation “depends on a variety of considerations external to the text,” including
history, precedents, “public expectations,” “practical considerations,” and “moral and
political values”); DANIEL FARBER & NEIL S. SEIGEL, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 6–9 (2019) (reviewing “multiple modalities”).
As Tribe writes, constitutional text and even text with “plain meaning” are
important, but “a proposition of constitutional law need not find its most obvious
support in the Constitution’s text to be deemed part of the supreme law of the land—
even by a reader whose ultimate lodestar is the text.” 1 TRIBE, supra, at 35. The
approach followed here is congruent with other “pluralist” constitutional theories.
See Berman, supra note 109, at 1337–44, 1353, 1412–13.
125. 1 TRIBE, supra note 124, at 85; see also FARBER & SEIGEL, supra note 124, at 9.
126. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1191–92 (1987).
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addition, intramodal conflicts, such as competing texts, as well as
intermodal conflicts, such as between text and history, or between history
and moral principles, can arise.127 In the case of a Senate Reform Act,
all of the interpretive modes point toward finding the statute
constitutional, though some modes such as history and moral principle
may argue more strongly in its favor than others such as text.
C. Textual Analysis
Altering the one state, two senators rule via a Senate Reform Act under
the authority of the voting-rights amendments would create an
intertemporal, intramodal textual conflict requiring resolution. Article
V’s prohibition against amending the rule presents an obstacle as well.
1.

The voting-rights amendments
The most relevant text supporting congressional reform of the
Senate is the Fourteenth Amendment. Passed immediately following
the Civil War, it promises “the equal protection of the laws.” 128
Supreme Court cases have applied the principle of equal protection
in the context of federal standards for voting rights in the states. 129
The Fourteenth Amendment expressly delegates enforcement power
to Congress.130 The plain implication is that Congress has been given
power to assure “equal protection of the laws” for citizens, including their
right to vote.
One might object that the delegated congressional power under the
Fourteenth Amendment is limited to protecting against infringements of
citizens’ rights only by the states rather than the United States.131
However, it makes no sense to say, for example, that Congress has power
to prohibit racial discrimination by the states but can do nothing about
similar racial discrimination by the federal government. In parallel

127. 1 TRIBE, supra note 124, at 87–88; see also J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771, 1796–98 (1994) (discussing the role of
conscience and intra-model conflict of statutory interpretation).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
129. See infra Section III.G.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
131. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that “no state shall” deny “equal protection of
the laws” to “any person within its jurisdiction”).
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situations, the Supreme Court has held the Fourteenth Amendment
to apply to the United States government too. 132
Additional text in the Constitution confers to Congress the power—
indeed the duty—to protect the right to vote. This text is found in the
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.
The Fifteenth Amendment provides: “The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”133
The Nineteenth Amendment: “The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of sex.” 134
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment: “The right of citizens of the United
States to vote [in federal elections] shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or
other tax.” 135

132. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (finding it “unthinkable” that
the Fourteenth Amendment would not apply also to the federal government in the
context of racial segregation of schools); see also FALLON, supra note 124, at 109
(noting that “the Supreme Court today applies the equal protection guarantee to
federal as well as state legislation, even though the Equal Protection Clause refers only
to what ‘no State’ may deny”); FALLON, supra note 108, at 37 (arguing that even if “the
legal case for Bolling” was weak in terms of text or previous precedents, the “Court
acted morally legitimately in deciding Bolling as it did”); Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 768 (1999) (arguing with respect to Bolling that
the Constitution “should mean no less for the federal government than for the
states . . . —what’s sauce for the state should be sauce for the feds”).
It is true that cases such as Bolling involve federal statutes rather than constitutional
provisions, and I do not argue that the voting-rights amendments should be
interpreted to strike down the one state, two senators rule directly. See infra Section
III.G. I maintain only that these amendments give Congress power to abrogate the
rule.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (emphasis added).
134. Id. amend. XIX, § 1 (emphasis added).
135. Id. amend. XXIV, § 1 (emphasis added); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 185, 402
(2012) (noting poll taxes were employed to suppress black votes, mostly in the
southern states). Although the text of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment applies only
to the United States, the Court has approved congressional authority to prohibit
disenfranchisement for failure to pay a poll tax by the states under other voting-rights
amendments. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (striking
down a state poll tax as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: “The right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.”136
The kicker is that all of these voting-rights amendments—adopted
over the century stretching from 1870 to 1971—include exactly the
same language in their enforcement clause: “The Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” 137
From a purely textual point of view, then, the voting-rights
amendments delegate power to Congress affirmatively to protect
voting rights based, first, on the principle of equality of all citizens
under the Fourteenth Amendment and, second, on the prohibition
of any curtailment of the right to vote “on account of” race, skin color,
ethnicity, sex, and age. 138 The voting-rights amendments taken
together provide a strong textual basis for Congress to take action to
correct any “denial” or “abridgment” of these rights in elections for
federal office, including the Senate. 139
To “abridge,” according to a standard dictionary definition, is “to
reduce in scope” or “to shorten in duration or extent.”140 To abridge a
right, then, is to reduce or shorten its scope and extent. The Supreme
Court agrees that “the core meaning” of “abridge” is to “shorten,”
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (emphasis added).
137. Id. amends. XV, § 2; XIX; XXIV § 2; & XXVI, § 2. The Thirteenth
Amendment abolishing slavery contains an identical provision. Id. amend. XIII, § 2.
138. As originally proposed, the Fourteenth Amendment would have explicitly
covered “race, color, nativity, property, education, or religious beliefs” as prohibited
categories. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–
1877 446 (updated ed. 2014). Suffragettes lost an attempt to include women’s rights
in the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (guaranteeing
voting rights only to “male inhabitants” and “male citizens”); see also STRAUSS, supra
note 41, at 13.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and others led the charge to reinterpret the Fourteenth
Amendment to include women. See Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal
Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 822–23 (2004);
see also ON THE BASIS OF SEX (Focus Features 2018); RBG (CNN Films 2018).
139. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment explicitly refers to the “right of citizens of
the United States to vote in any primary or other election . . . for Senator or
Representative in Congress . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. For the argument
that this text also informs the interpretation of the scope of the other voting-rights
amendments, see AMAR, supra note 135, at 405–08.
140. Abridge, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/abridge [https://perma.cc/yF3F-E4SL].
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which “entails a comparison.” 141 The relevant comparison here is the
relative voting weight of U.S. citizens in the several states. 142
Empirical evidence for abridgment “by the United States” of the
equal voting rights of citizens in the Senate is established by census data
reported in Table 1. 143 No intentionality or animus requirement appears
in the voting-rights amendments, and none should be conjured.144 The
United States itself—in the inherited and evolving governance structure
of the Senate—abridges its citizens’ equal rights to vote.
In addition to the unequal treatment of all citizens in larger states,
the census data (and one survey) show also that the same inequality
of distribution penalizes citizens in large states with respect to racial and
ethnic diversity, as well as other specifically protected categories.145 See
Table 4 on the next page.146 Because several voting-rights amendments aim
directly at the protection against abridgment of rights on the basis of race,

141. Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 333–34 (2000); cf. Michael Hurta,
Note, Counting the Right to Vote in the Next Census: Reviving Section Two of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 94 TEX. L. REV. 147, 155–56 (2015) (finding little legislative history
regarding the meaning of “abridge”).
142. See Reno, 528 U.S. at 333–34 (noting that an abridgment must be “relative to
what the right to vote ought to be” and how “the status quo itself must be changed”).
143. See supra Table 1. Technically, official decennial census data would be used.
144. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2332 (1997)
(observing that the maintenance of “a preferred status or a status hierarchy is no less
real simply because hatred or animus is absent”); see also Abridgement, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abridgment [https://
perma.cc/Q7UA-6JWZ] (abridgment means both “the action of abridging
something” and “the state of being abridged”).
Even if some standard of “discriminatory intent” would be required, the racially
tinged history in the creation of the several states under slavery should be found
sufficient to the purpose. See infra Section III.E; cf. Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory
Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1225–29, 1231 (2018) (describing “plural”
standards adopted in different contexts under the Fourteenth Amendment).
145. There is controversy surrounding how categories of “race” and ethnicity are
tabulated and reported. In particular, intercultural mixing and marriages produce
increasing numbers of people who identify as “two or more” or no particular “race”
or color. See Sabrina Tavernise, Racial Projection by the Census Is Making Demographers
Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2018, at A1.
146. See Population Distribution Based on Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-byraceethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0 (estimating population and demographic data
based on analysis of the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey from 2008–
2017).
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color, sex, and age, the reform is justified in order to remediate these
differences.
Table 4: Percentage Racial/Ethnic Profiles of the States*
State

White Black Hispanic Asian

United States 61%
Alabama
66
Alaska †
60
Arizona
54
Arkansas
72
California ††
38
Colorado
70
Connecticut
67
Delaware
62
Florida ††
55
Georgia
52
Hawaii
19
Idaho
82
Illinois
61
Indiana
81
Iowa
86
Kansas
74
Kentucky
84
Louisiana
59
Maine
92
Maryland
53
Massachusetts 72
Michigan
75
Minnesota
80
Mississippi
58
Missouri
79
Montana
89
Nebraska
78
Nevada
52
New Hampshire 92
New Jersey
58

12%
27
3
4
15
5
4
10
21
15
32
2
1
14
9
3
6
8
32
1
29
7
14
6
37
11
1
4
9
1
13

18%
4
7
34
7
39
19
16
11
26
10
10
13
17
6
6
14
5
5
2
11
12
5
6
3
4
3
13
27
3
18

6%
5
3
15
4
5
3
3
4
39
2
6
2
2
2
5
7
3
4
2
1
3
8
2
11

Native
Pacific
American Islander
1%
>1%
17
2
2
1
2
1
>1
>1
>1
17
>1
-
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New Mexico
New York ††
North Carolina
North Dakota †
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas ††
Utah
Vermont †
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming †

37
57
61
85
78
64
75
76
72
65
82
73
43
79
94
61
66
93
80
86

2
14
21
3
12
7
2
11
6
26
2
17
12
1
1
18
3
3
6
1

46
18
10
4
4
12
14
7
16
5
5
6
38
14
1
11
14
1
8
9

9
3
2
4
4
4
2
2
5
2
7
10
3
-

>1
4
8
>1
-

>1
>1
>1
-

District of
Columbia

38

46

10

5

-

-

* Excluded: percentage of two races/ethnicities reported ranging from one percent
to fourteen percent (in Hawaii) with a U.S. average of two percent.
† Four smallest states in population.
†† Four largest states in population.

The four most populous states, for example, have significantly
higher percentages of nonwhite citizens compared with the national
average. White citizens are a minority in California, Texas, Florida, and
New York. Nonwhite citizens in these states are doubly disadvantaged in
their right to vote: in general, along with every other citizen in their
states, and racially and ethnically, compared with white citizens in
other states. 147

147. See supra Tables 1 & 4.
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The four least populated states reveal the flip-side: states with
higher than average percentages of white citizens have greater voting
influence. Alaska is close to the national average, but the three other
smallest states are not: North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming are
eighty-five to ninety-four percent white. 148
Taking a larger slice of the data confirms a bias favoring white
citizens. The twelve states with the highest percentages of whites
qualify under the reform for only one senator (except Indiana which
gets two). The twelve states with the highest nonwhite percentages
include not only the four most populous states of California, Texas,
Florida, and New York, but also two states, Georgia and New Jersey,
that would qualify for an increase to three senators. Two more would
remain at two senators, and only four would drop to one. 149
A comprehensive empirical analysis confirms that the
representational structure of the Senate disfavors—and thus
“abridges”—the rights of nonwhite citizens. Comparing the national
population of whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians with the median
representation in each state, researchers find that whites “constitute
the only group that Senate apportionment advantages.”150 See Table 5
on the next page.151 “With regard to issues of race and ethnicity,” they
conclude, senate apportionment “works contrary to the purpose of
protecting minorities” and most “dramatically disadvantages
Hispanics.”152

148. See supra Tables 1 & 4.
149. In descending order, the twelve most nonwhite states are Hawaii, New
Mexico, California, Texas, Georgia, Nevada, Maryland, Arizona, Florida, New York,
Mississippi, and New Jersey. See supra Table 4.
150. LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 21.
151. Id. at 21 & tbl.2.1 (based on 1996 data).
152. Id. at 20, 22 & tbl.2.2; see also Malhotra & Raso, supra note 50, at 1045–46
(finding racial inequality in senate representation of African American and Hispanic
citizens, which results in harming them by reducing “distributive benefits” compared
with white populations and creating a “veto point” to stop civil rights legislation);
Griffin, supra note 21, at 406 (finding that “since 1960, African Americans have been
more likely than whites to reside in states with less voting weight,” and “this tendency
has become much more pronounced over time;” finding the same trend for Latino
populations; and finding that senators from states with less voting weight tend “to
support the positions advocated by civil rights groups”).
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Table 5: Percentage of Nation’s Population in Selected Racial and Ethnic
Groups Compared with Percentages in the Median State

Black
Hispanic
Asian
American Indian, Eskimo,
Aleut
White (non-Hispanic)
All minorities

National
Population
12.5
10.0
3.4
0.8

In Median
State
7.1
2.8
1.3
0.4

74.0
26.8

82.2
18.1

This evidence reinforces the argument that Congress has power to
address senate apportionment not only under the Fourteenth
Amendment (“equal protection” for all citizens), but also the Fifteenth
Amendment (abridgment of the right to vote on the basis of “race” or
“color”). The proposed reform addresses both problems at once.
In addition, empirical data show differentials in population distribution
that disadvantage other constitutionally protected categories of citizens,
though the percentage differences are not as great as for race, color, and
ethnicity. See Table 6 on the next page. 153

153. U.S. Census Data from 2017 estimates compiled via Simply Analytics. LGBT
percentages via Gallup Analytics, U.S. Dailies survey program (2016) (accessed by
Wharton Research Programming) based on the following: “I have one final question
we are asking only for statistical purposes. Do you, personally, identify as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgender?” The question may not include all nonbinary identifications.
Cf. Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 904–08 (2019)
(discussing the variety of nonbinary identifications). Percentages are rounded to
nearest whole number.
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Table 6: Percentage Gender, Age, and LGBT Identification in the States
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

Female
51
48
50
51
50
50
51
51
51
51
50
50
51
51
50
50
51
51
51
52
52
51
50
51
51
50
50
49
51
51
50
52
51
49
51

Age 18–24
10
10
10
10
10
9
9
10
9
10
9
10
9
10
10
10
9
10
8
9
10
10
9
10
10
9
10
9
9
9
10
10
10
12
9

Age 65-plus
16
10
16
17
13
13
16
17
20
12
17
15
15
15
17
15
16
14
19
14
16
16
15
15
16
17
15
14
16
16
16
16
15
17
16

LGBT
3
3
4
3
5
4
3
5
4
4
3
3
4
4
3
3
3
4
5
4
5
4
5
3
4
3
4
5
5
3
5
5
4
3
4
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Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

50
50
51
52
51
50
51
50
50
51
51
50
51
50
49

10
9
10
11
10
10
9
10
11
10
10
9
9
9
10

16
16
18
17
16
16
16
12
11
17
14
14
19
16
15

3
5
4
4
3
2
3
4
4
5
3
5
3
3
3

District of
Columbia

53

14

14

9
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The Nineteenth Amendment forbids abridgment of the right to
vote “on account of sex,” and census data shows some states to be
unequally represented in this respect. For example, the small states of
Alaska, Nevada, and North Dakota represent men disproportionately. 154
Citizens who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender
(LGBT) are also likely covered under the Nineteenth Amendment. 155
Survey data show a disparity of distribution. Large states including
California and New York report a significantly higher percentage of LGBT
citizens than small states, for example, though the overall distribution
varies only within a percentage point or two throughout the country.156
Voting rights with respect to “age” are protected by the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, and census data indicate differences in distribution here
too. The large state of Florida has a relatively higher percentage of older
residents who are therefore underrepresented.
Younger voters
(measured only approximately by census data available for the range of
eighteen to twenty-four) appear to be relatively evenly distributed,
though they may be slightly overrepresented in the small states of North
Dakota and Rhode Island. 157
Resolving the textual argument for constitutionality does not
require a final weighing of available empirical evidence. If Congress
considers the proposed reform, it would assemble a detailed factual
record. Census and survey data indicate a strong probability,
however, that the evidence would support congressional power to act.
Taken together, the voting-rights amendments present a strong
textual argument for a general right to vote that extends to Congress the
power to enact “appropriate legislation” to protect it.158 Repetition of
the same language in the enforcement provisions of the voting-rights
154. See supra Table 6. The Nineteenth Amendment applies to voting rights in
apportionment. See AMAR, supra note 135, at 286–91 (arguing the Nineteenth
Amendment articulates a “feminist Constitution” that applies to apportionment);
Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and
the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 949, 960 (2002) (arguing for a “synthetic reading
of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments”).
155. See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 153–56
(2016) (examining a trend in Supreme Court cases of increasing constitutional
protections for LGBT citizens while cutting back on voting rights protections for
racial and ethnic minorities).
156. See supra Table 6.
157. See supra Table 6.
158. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, § 5; XV, § 2; XIX; XXIV, § 2; XXVI, § 2.
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amendments “comprise an impressive colonnade of congressional
power.”159 As Akhil Amar writes:
Given the emphatic repetition of the phrase “right to vote” . . . , there
arose a strong argument to treat each right-to-vote amendment not as
an isolated island, but as part of an archipelago. At a certain point, it
became textually, historically, and structurally apt to read each
affirmation of a “right to vote” not by negative implication but by
positive implication. On this view, certain textually specified bases for
disenfranchisement were per se unconstitutional—race, sex, age
(above eighteen)—whereas all other disenfranchisements were
presumptively suspect as violating a more general right-to-vote
principle.160

The voting-rights amendments provide a broad and deep textual
foundation for the reform.161

159. Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 694–95 (2002).
160. AMAR, supra note 135, at 191; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE
CONSTITUTION 70 (1988) (arguing that voting rights evolved over time to become a
“core” constitutional principle); cf. Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon
Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 260–63 (2004) (arguing that the Fifteenth
Amendment repealed the weaker voting rights protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
161. Two arguments based on canons of construction may argue against this
conclusion. First, if a specific provision is clear, then other provisions should be read
as consistent. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 402, 406 (1950).
Second, if the language of the original Constitution is clear, there is a presumption
against implied repeal except where the two provisions cannot be interpreted to be
consistent. Id. at 404.
The “thrusts” of canons of construction are famously problematic, however,
because they are subject to the “parries” of counter-canons. Id. at 401. Practical
reasoning about purposes and ends is needed too. See generally Daniel A. Farber, The
Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV.
533 (1992). “Canon wars” in constitutional law should leave room for an
appreciation of purpose as well as text. See Anita S. Krishnakumar & Victoria F.
Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEX. L. REV. 163, 166–67 (2018) (book review).
On these grounds, one should reject arguments against the reform based on
various canons. A general parry invokes the counter-canon that later constitutional
provisions should trump earlier ones. The voting-rights amendments forged after
the Civil War should prevail over one state, two senators rule born in the crucible of
slavery.
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2.

Article V
A textual thicket arises from Article V’s restriction on any change
to “equal suffrage in the Senate.” 162 Again at first glance (and again
pun intended), Article V appears to lock in the one state, two senators
rule now and forever, forbidding any change even by amendment.
There are several textual arguments, however, that Article V should
not impede reform.
First, Article V limits constitutional amendments, and the proposed
reform invokes constitutional authority for the Congress to enact a
statute. 163 Therefore, Article V does not apply. 164
This is not mere legal sleight of hand. Remember that the votingrights amendments were adopted a century or more after the original
constitutional text. My reading here is analogous to how various proslavery provisions, such as the Fugitive Slave Clause and statutes
enacted under it, 165 were simply ignored after the adoption of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 166 Similarly, the
Nineteenth Amendment automatically and retroactively cancelled
references in the Fourteenth Amendment to “male” residents and
citizens. 167 It is true that the proposed Senate Reform Act is a statute
enacted under the authority of constitutional provisions rather than
a constitutional amendment itself, but this does not negate the
argument. Statutes enacted under the voting-rights amendments that
conflict with original pro-slavery or sexist constitutional provisions
prevail by virtue of the new statutes’ constitutional grounding in later
amending text. 168
162. U.S. CONST. art. V.
163. Id.
164. Article V is written as one paragraph without sentence breaks. Id. It is
therefore a fair reading that all provisions, including the final phrase regarding
“equal suffrage in the Senate,” refer to amendments and not statutes based on
explicitly delegated constitutional powers. Id.
165. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. See generally DELBANCO, supra note 110, at 5, 8–
9, 12, 18–20 (describing the history and importance of the Fugitive Slave Clause and
the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850).
166. See FINKELMAN, supra note 110, at 7–8 (listing other slavery-related clauses).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; 1 TRIBE, supra note 124, at 69–71; see also supra
note 138 and accompanying text.
168. Prohibition and its demise provide another obvious example. A statute passed
to regulate the production or distribution of “intoxicating liquors” under the
authority of the Twenty-First Amendment does not violate the repealed constitutional

2028

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1981

Second, the voting-rights amendments bestow power on Congress to
protect a different kind of “equal suffrage”—the kind belonging to
people rather than states. The Seventeenth Amendment, which
established the popular vote as the required method of election of
senators, replaced the original constitutional structure that gave state
legislatures the authority to name U.S. senators.169 State legislatures did
not and could not claim a loss of “suffrage” without consent under Article
V following the Seventeenth Amendment’s change of the very meaning of
“suffrage.” If “equal suffrage in the Senate” referred originally to a power
held by the states as entities, the Seventeenth Amendment removed this
power and placed it firmly in the hands of individual citizens. 170
Analogously, states would have no cause to contest a change to their
“equal suffrage” under the voting-rights amendments and their
construction and enforcement by Congress in a Senate Reform Act.
By its plain meaning, and in conjunction with the Seventeenth
Amendment as well as the voting-rights amendments, “equal suffrage
in the Senate” implies a measure of equal voting rights for citizens in
Congress. 171 Citizens in California today do not enjoy “equal suffrage
in the Senate” under a contemporary understanding of what “equal
suffrage” means.
This interpretation would not render the Equal Suffrage Clause
superfluous. Attempting to eliminate a state, allocating zero senators
to a state, or abolishing the Senate would run afoul of Article V
because no legitimate justification could be given that these actions

text of Eighteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII, XXI; see also LAWRENCE
LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 283–84 (2019) (arguing for a method of “interpretive synthesis” of
older text and newer amendments).
169. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Many states had already
begun electing senators by popular vote, but the Seventeenth Amendment made it
mandatory for all states. STRAUSS, supra note 41, at 132–35.
170. This analysis provides a partial response to Charles Fried’s argument that the
“equal dignity” of states should be preferred over the equal voting rights of citizens.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text. The Seventeenth Amendment speaks
clearly to the contrary.
171. U.S. CONST. art V; see id. amend. XVII; id. amends. XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI
(the voting-rights amendments).
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are aimed to protect equal voting rights within other relevant
constitutional constraints. 172
Third, even if one concedes Article V limits the authority of
Congress to enact legislation that is the equivalent of an amendment,
the plain meaning of the text does not constrain all congressional
action. Arguably, the states may “consent” to the reform through
their representatives in Congress. 173
With respect to the constitutional meaning of “consent,” Arthur
Machen argued long ago that the Fifteenth Amendment was “void”
under Article V with respect to those states that refused to ratify the
amendment. 174 Although three quarters of the states ratified the
Fifteenth Amendment, many did so only at the points of Union
generals’ guns. 175 A minority of states did not ratify at all. Even
though the Fifteenth Amendment went into effect, Machen argued
that it did not apply to those states that did not specifically “consent”
to it or explicitly rejected the change. 176
Machen’s view has fortunately not been followed, but his argument
is instructive in providing another reason why Article V should not
constrain the proposed reform. Because Congress is acting under the
powers granted by the voting-rights amendments, the states have
already “consented” to the use of this delegated authority, just as they

172. See Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?, 23 HARV. L. REV.
169, 172–73 (1910) (arguing that Article V must be read at least to preserve the
existence of states and the Senate itself).
One might contend that Representative Dingell’s proposal to abolish the Senate
would advance the cause of voting equality. Dingell, supra note 30. It would do
damage, however, to other structural components of the Constitution that provide
separate functions to the Senate (e.g., approval of treaties and judicial appointments,
as well as a bicameral check on the House). At a minimum, it would be less well
tailored to our constitutional structure than a Senate Reform Act.
173. See Machen, supra note 172, at 173.
174. Machen, supra note 172, at 173.
175. See LEPORE, supra note 110, at 32 (describing this kind of consent as
“constitutional coercion”); see also FALLON, supra note 108, at 84–87 (arguing that
despite the “manifest coercion” exerted to achieve ratification of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, they are still considered part of the “fundamental law of
the United States”).
176. Machen, supra note 172, at 173.
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have “consented” to congressional power to adopt other statutes, such
as the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 177
Fourth, Machen focused attention also on the meaning of “state” in
Article V. 178 He argued correctly that a “state” does not simply mean
an abstract entity, a government, or even a territory with
boundaries. 179 A “state,” at least in connection with the idea of
“consent,” must mean the “people” in it. 180 What Machen missed is
that the Civil War and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments worked a revolution in the very “people” who constitute
the states. The war liberated four million slaves, and the amendments
converted them (or at least the adult males) into citizens. 181 “We the
People” who compose the “states” were fundamentally changed—
especially in the formerly rebellious southern Confederacy. 182
Abraham Lincoln and Frederick Douglass recognized that this
change amounted to a “Second American Revolution,” 183 and the
Fourteenth Amendment forged “a second Constitution.” 184 As
Douglass observed, the “destiny” of the Civil War was to “unify and
177. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1973–1973b(b)(1) (2012)).
178. Machen, supra note 172, at 174.
179. Id.
180. Id. James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton made similar arguments in
opposing the one state, two senators rule at the Constitutional Convention. See
KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 185–86.
181. See BLIGHT, supra note 55, at 480–81; see also FONER, supra note 138, at xxvi
(observing that Reconstruction “redefined the meaning of American citizenship”
through, in part, “an unprecedented commitment to the ideal of a national
citizenship whose equal rights belonged to all Americans regardless of race”);
1 TRIBE, supra note 124, at 1293 (describing the Civil War as “a watershed in the direct
federal protection of individual rights”).
182. The “people” legally composing the “states” were changed again by the
Nineteenth Amendment and yet again by the Twenty-Sixth. See U.S. CONST. amends.
XIX, XXVI; see also ROGERS M. SMITH, POLITICAL PEOPLEHOOD: THE ROLES OF VALUES,
INTERESTS, AND IDENTITIES 146 (2015) (“The knitting and reknitting of conceptions
and coalitions espousing different visions of ‘We the People’ has been the warp and
woof of American political development.”); TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 81–125
(discussing the flexibility of defining “the people” in a democracy for various
purposes of “inclusion/exclusion”).
183. BLIGHT, supra note 55, at 415 (observing that “Lincoln and Douglass spoke
from virtually the same script” emphasizing a “rebirth” of “freedom” based on
“equality” after the Civil War).
184. Id. at 480.
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reorganize the institutions of this country” because otherwise the war
would have been “little better than a gigantic enterprise for shedding
human blood.”185 In this context, the voting-rights amendments
reconstituted the “people” in the “states” who are protected with “equal
suffrage in the Senate” under Article V.
3.

Intratextual conflict and “time’s arrow”
The better reading of the constitutional text—taking into account
what Laurence Tribe calls “time’s arrow” in its evolution—is to
interpret the voting-rights amendments as changing the meaning of
“consent” and “equal suffrage” in Article V, at least in the context of
a congressional statute narrowly tailored to protect the more recently
established equal voting rights. 186 The amendments changed the
composition of “We the People,” and they put the voting rights of U.S.
citizens on an “equal protection” footing. They delegate to Congress
the power to protect the voting rights of people excluded from the
original Constitution, and the states have “consented” to this power
through their ratification of the amendments.
This textual analysis of the proposed reform exposes an intramodal
and intertemporal conflict when different parts of the Constitution
pull in different directions. 187 A conflict emerges between (1) the
plain meaning of original text setting forth the one state, two senators
rule and (2) the later texts of the voting-rights amendments

185. Id. at 420–21 (quoting Douglass); see also FONER, supra note 138, at 602–03
(arguing that even though Reconstruction must be judged a “failure” after the rise of
the southern Redeemers, its constitutional changes provided “an unprecedented
redefinition of the American body politic” that would bode well in the future).
186. As Tribe describes “time’s arrow” in the evolution of interpretation of
constitutional text:
A revision to avoid conflicts with new constitutional text occurs when a
constitutional amendment so alters the rest of the Constitution that, upon
referring back to the constitutional provision in question, we are bound—
unless we are satisfied with a Constitution that merely collects
contradictions—to recognize a revision in that constitutional provision even
if the amendment did not in so many words decree a change in that
provision’s words.
1 TRIBE, supra note 124, at 67; see also TRIBE, supra note 160, at 156–57 & fig. VI
(showing “time’s arrow” as part of a “gyroscopic construction” exhibiting “a capacity
to grow” and “pull toward the future”).
187. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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establishing federally protected voting rights and giving Congress the
power to protect them.188
“Time’s arrow” favors an affirmative constructive act of Congress to
reduce significant voting inequality. The voting-rights amendments grant
Congress power to adopt a Senate Reform Act in a manner analogous to
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which has been described as “undoubtedly
the most important and most effective civil rights statute ever enacted.”189
D. Structural Considerations
There is a balance in the constitutional order between federalism—and
a proper recognition of the place and role of the states—and the
guarantee of fundamental political rights such an equal right to vote.190
The proposed Senate Reform Act respects both federalism and individual
rights.191
1.

Equal voting rights of “We the People”
The strongest structural argument in favor of the reform is that it delivers
on the foundational promise of the Declaration of Independence that “all

188. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. For example, the Seventeenth
Amendment adopted in 1913 is best read as repeating the original one state, two
senators rule only in order to clarify its primary purpose of establishing that senators
are directly “elected by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. By making senators
directly responsive to the voting public, it provides a bridge to a Senate Reform Act.
See also supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
189. Pildes, supra note 96, at 287; see also AMAR, supra note 135, at 287 (describing
the Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as “two of the most important
pieces of legislation in American history”); Terrye Conroy, The Voting Rights Act of
1965: A Selected Annotated Bibliography, 98 L. LIB. J. 663, 663 (2006) (“The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 is widely considered one of the most important and successful civil
rights laws ever enacted.”); Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to
Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (celebrating the
Voting Rights Act as “the cornerstone of the ‘Second Reconstruction’”).
190. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 124, at 6 (referring to these considerations as two of
several models for constitutional argument—Model I, emphasizing “separated and
divided powers,” and Model VI, emphasizing “equal protection”).
191. Cf. Ozan O. Varol, Structural Rights, 105 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1035 (2017) (“Under
any definition of democracy, the right to vote forms the core of structural democratic
governance. It is through the right to vote that citizens select their executive and
legislative representatives that make up their constitutional structure of
government.”).
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men [and women] are created equal.”192 Voting rights enable the
protection of other rights. As the Supreme Court has explained, the
right to vote is a “fundamental political right” because it is “preservative
of all rights.”193 The voting-rights amendments confirm the structural
importance of these rights.
If democracy means, as its ancient Greek roots suggest, that the
people rule, then equal voting rights for all citizens are
foundational. 194 They enable a sensible translation of the expressed
will of “We the People” into concrete practices and realities. 195
192. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also 1 LOUIS H.
POLLAK, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 16–
17 (1968) (“[T]he Declaration of Independence is the apt progenitor of the
Emancipation Proclamation, the Gettysburg Address, [and] the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of ‘the equal protection of the laws’ . . . .”); Frederick
Douglass, What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?, Address Delivered in Rochester,
New York (July 5, 1852), in 2 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS: SERIES ONE: SPEECHES,
DEBATES, AND INTERVIEWS 1847–54, at 363–64 (John W. Blassingame ed., 1982)
(“[T]he Declaration of Independence is the ring-bolt to the chain of your nation’s
destiny . . . . The principles contained in that instrument are saving principles. Stand
by those principles, be true to them on all occasions, in all places, against all foes,
and at whatever cost.”); George F. Will, Opinion, To Construe the Constitution, Look To
the Declaration, WASH. POST (July 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/to-construe-the-constitution-look-to-the-declaration/2019/07/03/3e025
ab8-9c43-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70 [https://perma.cc/HM5Z-ECMN] (“[R]ead the
Declaration, which illuminates what came next: the Constitution and a nation worth
celebrating.”).
193. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
194. As David Held explains,
While the word ‘democracy’ came into English in the sixteenth century from
the French démocratie, its origins are Greek. ‘Democracy’ is derived from
demokratia, the root meanings of which are demos (people) and kratos
(rule) . . . . Democracy entails a political community in which there is some
form of political equality among the people.
HELD, supra note 24, at 1; see also TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 2 (“[T]he word
democracy . . . conveys a seemingly simple idea: the people (demos) rule or hold power
(kratos). Democracy is the promise of people ruling, . . . yet who counts as the people,
how they rule, and where they do so remain eternally up for debate.”); infra Section
III.F (discussing moral principles supporting equal voting rights as a feature of
democracy).
195. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see AMAR, supra note 135, at 54–56 (describing the
“enactment argument” as one that relies on the text of “We the People” but also goes
beyond the text to include a structural argument in historical context). See generally
2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (describing how the
Civil War period and its aftermath established political equality, including voting
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2.

Preservation of federalism
A principal structural objection to the proposed reform is likely to
come from defenders of federalism who emphasize the importance of
states’ rights against the encroachment of federal power.196 This
challenge would argue that changing the one state, two senators rule
would constitute an assault on the “equal suffrage” of the states qua
states, and therefore their comparative power.197 On this view, to change
this rule would undermine the original structure of federalism.
This argument fails, however, because the reform would strengthen
the federal structure, while at the same time giving force to the
principle of equal voting rights. The reform changes nothing
regarding the independence and the authority of the states regarding
the election of U.S. senators. It changes only the allocation of the
number of senators to each state. It respects the principle of federalism
by allocating a minimum of one senator to each state, and respects the
constitutional rights of states to set the conditions for the election of
senators. 198 States may also decide to adopt innovative election schemes
to improve democratic representation and potentially reduce political
equality, as a central constitutional principle); LESSIG, supra note 168, at 426 (arguing
that constitutional “synthesis” requires recognizing many “moments” over time that
represent “a significant decision by ‘we the people’”).
At a telling moment at the founding, a final drafting committee amended the
preamble to read “We the People of the United States” rather than “We the People
of [list of all the states].” See BEEMAN, supra note 4, at 347–48. This change reinforces
the proposition that citizens have voting rights as citizens of the United States and
not only as citizens of their respective states. See infra notes 351–59 and accompanying
text (discussing how people are both citizens of states and citizens of the United
States).
196. Federalism considerations were central in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529
(2013), which trimmed a part of the Voting Rights Act on grounds that it was an
unconstitutional violation of state prerogatives. See id. at 543–44, 557. However, as
discussed infra Section III.G, the facts of this case are inapposite to the proposed
reform which focuses on the structure of the federal government and not the practices
of the states. Shelby County reaffirmed the Court’s commitment to equal voting rights
and the power of Congress to vindicate them. See 570 U.S. at 553 (“The Fifteenth
Amendment commands that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on
account of race or color, and it gives Congress the power to enforce that command.”).
197. U.S. CONST. art. V; see, e.g., Fried, supra note 25, at 997 (“In the family of
nations, there are small countries and vast ones, and yet we are committed to the
independence, the equal dignity of even the smallest.”).
198. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII; see also Shelby County, 570 U.S.
at 543 (reviewing the prerogatives of the states regarding the voting process).

2019]

SENATE DEMOCRACY

2035

polarization.199 States would retain authority to decide the details of
these elections within the confines of the Seventeenth Amendment and
federal rights to vote.
It is true that abolishing the one state, two senators rule would
reduce some semblance of equality of states qua states as entities
within the federal structure. The balance of power would shift within
the Senate to larger states. For example, the seven largest states of
California, Texas, Florida, New York, Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania
would account for forty-five of 110 senators, and adding in the five states
that gain one senator—Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina,
and Virginia—produces a sixty-senator majority.200 This rebalancing
with respect to population, however, would not lead to any significant
geographical or political imbalance.201 A more compact group of large
states would also likely increase the relative power of the states vis-à-vis
the national government.
It is also true that citizens in some rural states would lose leverage,
but there is no compelling constitutional or political reason for
overrepresenting rural rather than urban populations. Note also that
rural populations in some very large states such as California, Florida,
New York, and Texas are currently underrepresented.202 In addition, the
proposed reform maintains mathematical overrepresentation of four states
with less than one-quarter of one percent of the total population (Alaska,
North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) using a principle of federalism to
avoid rounding to zero.203 Some mostly rural states are therefore still
relatively overrepresented in the reformed allocation.
Allocating a minimum of one senator to each state is a compromise
that readjusts the dramatic current imbalance in representation, while
preserving the “political safeguards of federalism.” 204 Readjusting the
199. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
200. See supra Table 1.
201. See infra Section III.D.8 (discussing the limited impact the reform would have
on the Electoral College system’s features of federalism and political stability); infra
Part IV (explaining the reform’s minimal effect on the political makeup of the Senate
and the likelihood that ideological perspectives will guide politicians’ views of the
reform more than regional geographical considerations).
202. See supra Table 1; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text; infra notes 435–
39 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Table 1.
204. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
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allocation of senators under the reform would strengthen rather than
undermine our federal structure. 205 The historical drift toward
increasing inequality of U.S. Senate representation is a bug, not a
feature, of American-style federalism.
3.

Preservation of senate functions
The reform changes only the allocation of senators. It retains the
structure of six-year terms, respects the Three Classes Clause, and
maintains all senate functions regarding treaties, impeachment, and
confirmations of appointments.206 It is therefore a relatively moderate
change compared with other reform proposals.207
4.

Removal of unfair bargaining advantages of small states
The reform would reduce structural unfairness and inefficiencies
that allow small states to bargain for larger per capita economic
benefits than larger states. 208 Small states may often leverage their
disproportionate representation to claim more than their fair share of
government expenditures. Empirical research confirms that “smaller
states tend to receive more federal dollars per capita than large states,
controlling for differences in states’ need for federal funds,” and
excluding federal entitlement programs for the poor and elderly. 209
205. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549,
1550–53, 1556, 1560 (2012) (describing leading versions of federalism as it has
appeared in the American political system and noting that states manifest power in
alternative ways).
206. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1–2, 6; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
207. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
208. Some residual benefit for very small states may remain, given the mandatory
minimum of one representative and one senator under the federalism constraint. See
supra notes 90, 203–04 and accompanying text.
209. LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 158–60; see also Valentino Larcinese et
al., Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the
Allocation of Federal Budget, 25 ECON. & POL. 257, 259, 275–76, 280 (2013) (finding
small states receive more defense spending than larger states, but also correlating
differentials to other variables such as how fast different states are growing); Frances
E. Lee, Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics, 94 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 59, 61–66 (2000) (showing with case studies of transportation legislation
how smaller state funding advantages are built through coalition-building with
senators from larger states).
Senators from small states may also prove easier and less expensive to lobby or
bribe. TUCKER, supra note 7, at 22–23.
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A Senate Reform Act would mitigate this unfairness and inefficiency
while abiding by federalism constraints.
5.

Reduction of risks of secession and national instability
The federal structure giving citizens from small states enormously
greater clout per citizen than those in much larger states risks longterm structural instability. 210 Citizens in large states are likely to resent
representational inequality over time, especially given that it is
increasing. 211 In extreme cases, they may go so far as to contemplate
secession. A Civil War costing hundreds of thousands of lives
cemented the Union against the attempt of eleven southern states to
secede.212 Subsequent world wars in which the United States played a
decisive role may cast doubt on the prospect of a possible future
secession. However, the recent examples of referendums seeking
secession in Catalonia, Scotland, and Quebec suggest that this concern
may also lie dormant within regions of the United States.213
For example, citizens in California or Texas, the most populous states,
could consider the option of a democratic secession to be justified in part
by an unrepresentative Senate. 214
California constitutes a population and an economy of sufficient size
to become a nation-state on its own. Led by Hollywood and Silicon
210. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 160, at 208 (arguing for “stability” as a constitutional
principle in a “gyroscopic” understanding of the Constitution); Sonia Mittal & Barry
R. Weingast, Constitutional Stability and the Deferential Court, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 337,
344–45 (2010) (arguing that stability is an important objective of constitutional
structure, including a reason for the Supreme Court to defer on occasion to public
opinion).
211. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
212. DREW GIPLIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN
CIVIL WAR xi, 255, 257 (2008) (counting more than 600,000 deaths); LEPORE, supra
note 110, at 293 (estimating more than 750,000 casualties).
213. See Montserrat Guibernau et al., Introduction: A Special Section on SelfDetermination and the Use of Referendums: Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland, 27 INT’L J. POL.,
CULTURE & SOC’Y 1, 1–3 (2014). But cf. Huq, supra note 38, at 1171–72, 1206–07
(arguing that the rigidity of the amending process of the U.S. Constitution made
secession less likely at least in the early antebellum period).
214. See Sasha Issenberg, Divided We Stand: The Country is Hopelessly Split. So Why
Not Make It Official and Break Up?, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 14, 2018),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/maybe-its-time-for-america-to-splitup.html [http://perma.cc/CB3R-GC3D] (providing an account of contemporary
U.S. secession movements).
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Valley, its nearly $3 trillion economy would count, if it stood alone, as the
fifth largest in the world behind only the United States itself, China,
Japan, and Germany.215 Since 2015, a group has been “circulating
petitions to give citizens a direct vote on whether they want to turn
California into ‘a free, sovereign and independent country,’ which could
trigger a binding 2021 referendum on the question already being
called ‘Calexit.’” 216 California, joined by Oregon and Washington,
has been increasingly at odds also with the Trump administration.217
Texas has a long tradition of independence as the Lone Star State.218
As President Lincoln cautioned at the outbreak of the Civil War, Texas was
the only state that claimed separate sovereignty prior to being annexed
(except for the original thirteen colonies).219 Notwithstanding Lincoln’s
warning—and the terrible experience of the Civil War itself—some Texas
politicians have again begun to threaten secession, including former
Governor Rick Perry.220 At a Tea Party rally in 2009, Perry mentioned the

215. Michael Greenberg, California: The State of Resistance, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Jan.
17, 2019), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/01/17/california-the-state-ofresistance [https://perma.cc/ZCK6-QM3C]; Lisa Marie Segarra, California’s Economy Is
Now
Bigger
Than
All
of
the
U.K.,
FORTUNE
(May
5,
2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/05/05/california-fifth-biggest-economy-passes-unitedkingdom [https://perma.cc/LDG5-FDLV].
216. Issenberg, supra note 214. But see Greenberg, supra note 215 (observing that
Calexit has “little popular support”).
217. See Timothy Egan, Revenge of the Coastal Elites, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2019, at A22.
218. See generally RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL, GONE TO TEXAS: A HISTORY OF THE LONE
STAR STATE (3d. ed. 2017) (characterizing the transformation of Texas from Spanish
frontier, to a Mexican province, to an independent republic, and finally to an annex
of the United States).
219. In Lincoln’s words,
[N]o one of our States, except Texas, ever was a sovereignty. And even Texas
gave up the character on coming into the Union; by which act she
acknowledged the Constitution of the United States, and the laws and treaties
of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution, to be, for her,
the supreme law of the land. The States have their status in the Union, and
they have no other legal status.
Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in BASLER,
supra note 82, at 604.
Another exception is Hawaii, which was annexed without the consent of its
inhabitants, and of course all states were formed from land originally claimed by
indigenous peoples. See supra note 104 and infra note 259.
220. Issenberg, supra note 214.
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option of independence, and his lieutenant governor had meetings with
the Texas Nationalist Movement.221
One poll found fully one quarter of American citizens to favor
secession of their states. 222 In 2012, the White House received petitions
from all fifty states to secede, with 125,000 signatures from Texas
leading the list. 223 Although probably very unlikely at present, Omar El
Akkad imagines a dystopian future in which political polarization leads
to a new and brutal civil war. 224
Senate reform would alleviate the unfair representation that affects
citizens in the largest states. Knitting these states more closely into
the union would tap down secessionist talk and increase long-term
national stability. 225
6.

Comparable size of the Senate
The estimated 110 senators under the Senate Reform Act compares
to the current structure of 100 senators. The Rule of One Hundred
approximates the current size of the Senate and will continue to do
so over time. 226 Because the Senate is smaller and serves longer terms
than the House, it has been said to act as a more “deliberative” body. 227
The Rule of One Hundred keeps total Senate numbers in check, and
with six-year terms continuing, the Senate would continue to act as a
deliberative body, if in fact it does so now. 228
221. Id.
222. Id. (citing Reuters poll).
223. Id.
224. OMAR EL AKKAD, AMERICAN WAR (2017) (describing a fictional future world of
climate catastrophe in which Blue and Red states have fragmented into warring
factions).
225. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 185–86 (Erin Kelly ed.,
2001) (arguing that “the power of equal citizens” in a constitutional order promotes
stability).
226. See supra Part II.
227. See LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 18 (“Defenders of the Senate often
argue that its primary function is to serve as a more deliberative legislative body than
the House.”).
228. Id. at 18–19 (“Although many institutional features of the Senate—such as its
small size, its long terms of office, and its rules for debate—may help to create a more
deliberative body, Senate apportionment bears no connection to this aim.”). Recent
accounts of the Senate in action, however, suggest that it is characterized lately more
by partisan rancor than any true deliberation. See Joseph Postell, What’s the Matter
with Congress? 18 CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS 56, 58 (2018).
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7.

New states
The Senate Reform Act would smooth a path to possible statehood
for underrepresented U.S. citizens, such as those living in the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and perhaps the Pacific Islands. 229 “No
taxation without representation” is a founding principle of the United
States, and it should apply to these U.S. citizens who should be
allowed to form new states if they wish. 230 The District of Columbia
has adopted the motto “Taxation Without Representation” on its
license plates as a protest beginning in 2000.231 Because the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other territories are not states, their citizens
have been denied constitutional claims for congressional representation.232
The reform would change only one of the ground rules for the
admission of new states, but it is important one. The unwritten “equal
footing doctrine” provides for the admission of new states on the same
basis as the original ones, including two senators and a proportional
number of representatives in the House. 233 This rule would likely apply
today if the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico were admitted as the
fifty-first and fifty-second states. Changing the “equal footing” rule for
new states with respect to the Senate would reduce political resistance
An alternative that considerations of political feasibility may recommend to avoid
the problem of “loss aversion” would be to double the size of the allocation, using a
baseline minimum of two senators per state and a Rule of Two Hundred. See infra
notes 427–29 and accompanying text; infra Table 9.
229. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. Federal law allows five official
delegates from the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, and
the Virgin Islands to participate in activities of the House of Representatives. See
Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 629, 630–31 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reviewing history and
citing statutory authority). Territorial delegates may vote in committee proceedings,
but do not have a vote equivalent to an official representative of a state. Id. at 631–
32 (upholding largely “symbolic” right of delegates to participate in the Committee
of the Whole in the House).
230. See Grant Dorfman, The Founders’ Legal Case: “No Taxation Without
Representation” Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1377, 1408–10 (2008)
(finding the political case for the principle stronger than the legal one).
231. DC License Plates Through the Years, WASHINGTONIAN (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://www.washingtonian.com/2015/10/08/dc-license-plates-through-the-years
[https://perma.cc/DQ8B-MK2R].
232. E.g., Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594–95 (1st Cir. 2010) (Puerto
Rico); Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41 (D.D.C.), aff’d sub nom. Alexander v.
Mineta, 531 U.S. 940 (2000), and aff’d, 531 U.S. 941 (2000) (District of Columbia).
233. See AMAR, supra note 135, at 259.
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to admitting the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico because they
would each receive only one senator. 234
The Twenty-Third Amendment allocates votes in the Electoral College
to the District of Columbia as if it were a state.235 However, this is a poor
excuse for full representation of citizens in a capital city with a
population larger than the two smallest states. 236 Note also that the
District of Columbia has a higher percentage of people of color, as
well as LGBT citizens, than the U.S. average, enhancing the argument
that the District should benefit from fair and equal representation. 237
The U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, which is also ethnically diverse,
deserves representation too. Around ninety-eight percent of Puerto
Ricans identify as Hispanic or Latino. 238 A majority of them appear to
want statehood.239 The case for Puerto Rican statehood is even stronger
234. See supra Table 1.
235. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
236. See Mary M. Cheh, Theories of Representation: For the District of Columbia, Only
Statehood Will Do, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 65, 86–87 (2014) (“When the District
must give up one form of autonomy to secure another form of autonomy, there is
neither a gain for residents nor movement forward.”).
Another option is the retrocession of the District of Columbia (or a part of it) back
into the state of Maryland. See Charles Lane, The Answer to D.C. Congressional
Representation? It’s in Douglass County, Maryland, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-answer-to-dc-congressionalrepresentation-its-in-douglass-county-maryland/2019/02/18/246635e2-33c1-11e9af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html [https://perma.cc/U6XY-CNXL] (creatively naming
the new county for Frederick Douglass). Retrocession has previously been used to
allow Virginia to reclaim Alexandria from the District by federal statute in 1846. See
Adams, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (citing Act of July 9, 1846, ch. 35, 9 Stat. 35).
237. See supra Tables 4 & 6. Congress proposed an amendment to treat the District
of Columbia as if it were a state in 1978, but only sixteen states approved it. AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 457 (2005). There is no reason
Congress could not constitutionally reduce the extent of its jurisdiction over the
federal district and grant the remaining residential areas statehood, as an expansion
from what it has already allowed as municipal home rule. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 17 (District Clause); id., art. IV, § 3 (New States Clause); see also Adams, 90 F. Supp.
2d at 47, 49 (noting that Congress authorized home rule for the District, including a
mayor, in 1973).
238. QuickFacts:
Puerto Rico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/quickfacts/fact/table/pr [https://perma.cc/X2NG-W35Y].
239. See Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Puerto Rico and the Right of Accession, 43 YALE
J. INT’L L. 229, 269 (2018). In 2017, in a referendum designed by a pro-statehood
government, ninety-seven percent favored statehood, though the turnout was only
twenty-three percent of the population, partly because anti-statehood factions
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given that Hispanic populations seems to suffer the worst abridgment in
senate representation of any discrete minority group.240 Because Puerto
Rico equals about one-hundredth of the U.S. population, it would qualify
for one senator. It is larger than twenty states.241
In this context, the deaths of almost 3000 Puerto Rican U.S. citizens
in the path of Hurricane Maria in 2017, plus an estimated $9 billion
in damages, are germane. 242 The disaster and its aftermath would
have garnered greater political and media attention if Puerto Rico
had been a state. The response by the federal government would also
have been improved if Puerto Rico had one senator and a
complement of five representatives in the House—as well as attendant
Electoral College votes.243
One can also imagine the creation of a new state comprising the nonrepresented citizens in the U.S. territories of American Samoa, Guam,
boycotted the referendum. Antonio Weiss & Brad Setser, America’s Forgotten Colony:
Ending Puerto Rico’s Perpetual Crisis, FOREIGN AFF. 158, 161 (July/Aug. 2019). A new
and fair referendum would provide an update of the general sentiment.
240. See supra notes 50 & 152 and accompanying text. See generally JUAN R.
TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND
UNEQUAL (1985) (providing comprehensive historical legal background and arguing
for statehood).
241. See supra Table 1.
242. Vann R. Newkirk II, A Year After Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico Finally Knows How
Many People Died, ATLANTIC (Aug 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2018/08/puerto-rico-death-toll-hurricane-maria/568822
[https://perma.cc/C6H9-9DWE]; Weiss & Setser, supra note 239, at 158 (recounting
“thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands displaced, millions left without
electricity, and, by some estimates, economic losses as high as $90 billion”).
243. See Blocher & Gulati, supra note 239, at 232 (noting that if Puerto Rico were
admitted as a state, it would qualify for five representatives in the House); Eliza
Barclay et al., Hurricane Maria: 4 Ways the Storm Changed Puerto Rico—And the Rest of
America, VOX (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/9/20/17871330/
hurricane-maria-puerto-rico-damage-death-toll-trump [https://perma.cc/3UD-DNY
D] (giving lessons from the disaster and noting renewed interest in statehood);
Frances Robles, $3,700 Generators and $666 Sinks: FEMA Contractors Ran Up Puerto Rico
Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2018, at A1 (reporting corruption and mismanagement by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency).
A suggestion has been made that a constitutional amendment similar to the
Twenty-Third Amendment giving D.C. representation in the Electoral College
should be adopted for Puerto Rico. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII; Weiss & Setser, supra
note 239, at 166. But statehood would provide citizens with equal health care and
other federal benefits. Weiss & Setser, supra note 239, at 167. It would also be easier,
requiring only congressional authorization rather than constitutional amendment.
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the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (or some
combination of them), which may together qualify for one senator and
one representative. 244 A new Pacific Islands state would create the
smallest state in the union. 245
There is another structural benefit related to geographical integrity
of representation. Adding the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and
the Pacific Islands as states would increase the representation of states
affected by rising sea levels and increasing hurricane risks associated
with global climate disruption. Granting proportional representation
to larger coastal states, such as California, Texas, Florida, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, and Virginia, would likewise increase
senate representation of states impacted most by the climate crisis. 246
8.

A more representative Electoral College
The Senate Reform Act would improve the representativeness of
the Electoral College because the electoral votes of each state are
determined by the number of representatives and senators. 247 The
reform would reduce overrepresentation of small states, with any
remaining inequality required by our federal structure.
An alternative proposal for an interstate compact among the states
to eliminate reliance on the Electoral College has gathered steam in
recent years, fueled by public dismay after two recent elections of

244. See also Developments in the Law, The U.S. Territories, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1616,
1617 (2017) (examining complex legal circumstances of the various territories).
245. See supra Table 1. One activist has argued for a constitutional amendment to
provide non-state representation for U.S. citizens living in the various territories. Neil
Weare, Equally American: Amending the Constitution to Provide Voting Rights in U.S.
Territories and the District of Columbia, 46 STETSON L. REV. 259, 264–65 (2017). Simply
granting statehood, however, seems a much easier course.
246. See, e.g., RISKY BUSINESS: THE ECONOMIC RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE
UNITED STATES 2–3 (2014), http://riskybusiness.org/report/national [https://
perma.cc/SSM4-K8YR] (providing an overview of various risks posed by climate shifts
in different regions in the United States). At the same time, it is true, as the Risky
Business report also shows, that climate risks of different kinds severely affect all
states. Id. at 19; see also TUCKER, supra note 7, at 18–19 (arguing that Pacific Island
territories would push for climate regulation if granted representation).
247. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate:
The Framers, Federalism, and One Person, One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2544 (2001)
(arguing that “the chief objection to the [Electoral College] system is generally that
it violates the one-person, one-vote principle”).
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presidents who did not receive a majority of the popular vote.248 Under a
proposed National Popular Vote (NPV) interstate compact, a number of
states have agreed to cast their electoral votes according to the majority
vote in the entire country, doing an end run around the Electoral
College.249 As of this writing, sixteen states have adopted the plan,
accounting for 196 of the 270 electoral votes needed.250 Legislation has
moved forward seriously in eight additional states accounting for seventyfive electoral votes, so there is some prospect of success.251
The NPV idea raises some structural problems, however, related to
federalism.252 It may also prove unconstitutional. 253

248. The five presidents who were elected with a minority of the popular vote are
Donald J. Trump, George W. Bush, Benjamin Harrison, Rutherford B. Hayes, and
John Quincy Adams. Rachel Revesz, Five Presidential Nominees Who Won Popular Vote
But Lost the Election, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk
/news/world/americas/popular-vote-electoral-college-five-presidential-nomineeshillary-clinton-al-gore-a7420971.html [https://perma.cc/7ZE6-WKNX].
249. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE (NPV) INITIATIVE:
DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT BY INTERSTATE COMPACT 10 (May 9, 2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43823.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQW4-GELN]; see
also AMAR, supra note 135, at 457–61 (providing background on the NPV idea).
250. NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com [https://
perma.cc/NX4B-KY25]. The NPV compact would go into effect when the number
of states signed up reaches the magic number of an electoral majority, which is 270
votes.
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1237, 1239 (2012) (discussing problems of oversight of voting and the
eligibility of voters by the states); Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College:
Federalism, Majoritarianism, and the Perils of Sub-constitutional Change, 100 GEO. L.J. 173,
203, 232–33 (2011) (emphasizing the problem of state authority over voting, the
possibility of a national recount, and the possibility of election of a President by a
plurality rather than majority vote).
253. Stanley Chang, Updating the Electoral College: The National Popular Vote
Legislation, 44 HARV. J. LEGIS. 205, 213 (2007) (“The constitutionality of the NPV
interstate compact has not been definitively established.”); Norman R. Williams, Why
the National Popular Vote Compact is Unconstitutional, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1523, 1527
(2012) (arguing the approach violates the Presidential Elections Clause). But see
Vikram David Amar, Response: The Case for Reforming Presidential Elections by
Subconstitutional Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular Vote Compact, and
Congressional Power, 100 GEO. L.J. 237, 242 (2011) (defending the NPV).
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Richard Posner points out several structural problems with abolishing
or skirting the Electoral College.254 First, the Electoral College provides
relative certainty of election outcomes. Close elections in one or two
states requiring a recount are bad enough, but a close election in the
entire country of several hundred million people could cause
disastrous delay, uncertainty, and discord. Second, the Electoral
College requires presidential candidates to pursue a regional blockvote method of assembling a path to victory—rather than simply piling
up huge voting margins in particular states—thus encouraging regional
balance in a big, continent-sized country. Third, the Electoral College
prevents costly and potentially divisive run-off elections.
Assuming the Electoral College survives, the reform would make it
more representative, and the Electoral College system would retain
its positive structural features related to federalism and political
stability. The overall balance of the current system would not
significantly change. See Figure 1 on the next page. 255

254. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of the Electoral College, SLATE (Nov. 12, 2012),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/11/defending-the-electoral-college.html
[https://perma.cc/D6RE-D7GL].
255. Figure from Table 1 and Electoral College map. See 2020 Presidential Election
Map, 270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com [https://perma.cc/B5RY-JX2J].
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Figure 1: Electoral College: Before and After Proposed Reform*
Current

Reformed

*
Geographically small states not shown are Connecticut (7 to 6), Delaware (3
to 2), Hawaii (3 to 2), Maryland (10 and 10), Massachusetts (11 and 11), New Jersey
(14 to 15), and Rhode Island (3 to 2).
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Because lack of one-person-one-vote representation is the primary
objection to the Electoral College, the reform would supply a
constitutionally nonintrusive solution yielding more voting rights
equality while respecting federalism. Even if a National Public Vote
interstate compact were to be adopted and upheld as constitutional,
the Senate Reform Act would provide a needed rebalancing of
representation for other reasons.
E. Historical Context
The history of the Constitution and the United States itself combines
two primary and contradictory narratives. One is the story of progressive
enlightenment after a founding revolution fought for the assertion of
basic rights. This story includes the expansion of the franchise, extending
the right to vote, unevenly and intermittently, from white male propertyowners,256 to all white men regardless of wealth,257 to all men regardless of
skin color including former slaves,258 to women,259 to indigenous peoples
who acceded to mandatory conditions, 260 and finally to all adults
256. See KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 622 (recounting that the ideology of race was
used to justify the restriction of the franchise to white males); see also LEPORE, supra
note 110, at 55–56 (describing that few states allowed free blacks to vote on equal
terms, but most states applied property qualifications of one sort or another and
allowed only white men to vote). See generally AMAR, supra note 135, at 184.
257. Originally, voting rights were left entirely to the states. See Harper v. Va. Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668, 670 (1966) (striking down ownership of wealth and
payment of poll taxes as voting qualifications and commenting that “[w]ealth, like
race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the
electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of
race . . . are traditionally disfavored”); see also LEPORE, supra note 110, at 56–57, 122
(explaining that by 1860 the property qualification for voting for white men had been
eliminated everywhere).
258. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV. However, tactics to suppress voting
based on race continue. In 2018, for example, credible allegations of racist voter
suppression were made in at least seven states. German Lopez, The Right to Vote Is
Under Siege in 2018, VOX (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/11/6/18065970 [https://perma.cc/2RMA-H2V7].
259. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; see, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Corruption
Temptation, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 25, 31 (2014) (arguing that women of color were
guaranteed the right to vote only with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
260. European colonists regarded indigenous people as members of foreign
nations with whom they made treaties, and then repeatedly and consistently broke
them. See ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 142, 202–05 (2014). They were exempted from constitutional rights. U.S.
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regardless of age. 261 These periodic extensions of voting rights tell
the story of the United States since its founding as one of a democratic
republic with ever-expanding voting rights.
Another narrative tells of conquest and slavery. Dorothy Roberts writes:
“The toxic convergence of race, biology, and politics is rooted in the very
origin of this nation. Race was instituted as a system of governance and
‘moral apology’ for keeping Africans in chains and violently dispossessing
Indian tribes.”262 This narrative includes the violent expansion of the
national map and the explosion of a Civil War that ended the sin of slavery.
After a short Reconstruction, racist retrenchment and another century of
segregation under Jim Crow followed, until a revitalized civil rights
movement in the 1960s led to the passage of landmark federal civil and
voting rights statutes in a Second Reconstruction. 263
The unrepresentative Senate sounded some particularly sour notes
in this history, such as when it filibustered House-passed federal antilynching laws three times in the 1920s and 1930s, and when it killed

CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (excluding “Indians not taxed”); id. amend. XIV, § 2 (same).
In 1887, a federal statute opened a path to citizenship for indigenous people, and
approximately two-thirds of them had become citizens by 1924, when the Indian
Citizenship Act extended the right to vote to all indigenous people born in U.S.
territories. See Developments in the Law, Securing Indian Voting Rights, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1731, 1733 (2016). The path to citizenship for indigenous people was
conditioned, however, on their acceptance of the theft of their lands and renouncing
tribal loyalties: a “forced assimilation.” LEPORE, supra note 110, at 337. States also
dragged their feet in recognizing Indian rights to vote until as late as 1962. Becky
Little, Native Americans Weren’t Guaranteed the Right to Vote in Every State Until 1962,
HIST. STORIES (Feb 12, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/native-americanvoting-rights-citizenship [https://perma.cc/2PQY-UVBS].
261. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
262. ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 309; see also Gross, supra note 113, at 321 (“Slavery
is still the touchstone for all of our discussions about race in America—as it should
be, because race was born out of slavery. It is our nation’s original sin. Through the
telling and re-telling of the history of slavery, we judge our own responsibility for the
continuing injustices of racial inequality.”).
263. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 20–58 (rev. ed. 2011) (describing the history of legalized
racism in the United States from its founding in slavery to today’s mass
incarceration); KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 262–65 (discussing the centrality of the
issue of slavery at the founding); see also KARLAN, supra note 189, at 2 (describing
“Second Reconstruction”).
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House-approved anti-poll tax bills twice in the 1950s. 264 This counternarrative to the story of expanding voting rights speaks in tones of
racism, sexism, and bias against “the other.”
Jill Lepore describes the historical legacies of “liberty” and “slavery”
as “the American Abel and Cain.” 265 They continue to compete in the
United States today. American citizens voted to elect the first black
president for two terms beginning in 2008, and then elected a
president in 2016 who traded in racist innuendo and condoned the
rise (again) of white nationalism in America. 266
The states and their representation in the Senate comprise a core part
of this historical narrative. As legal scholar Robert Cover observed, “the
place of slavery within the union” inscribes “a fault line in the normative
topography of American constitutionalism.”267 The historian Richard
Beeman reminds us that “we cannot avert our eyes from the magnitude
of the evil sanctioned by the Founding Fathers.”268 The Three Fifths and
Fugitive Slave Clauses, 269 as well as a slavery-slanted Electoral
College, 270 assured overrepresentation of the southern slave states

264. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 451 (2004).

265. See LEPORE, supra note 110, at 38.
266. See Lindsay Pérez Huber, “Make America Great Again!”: Donald Trump, Racist
Nativism and the Virulent Adherence to White Supremacy Amid U.S. Demographic Change, 10
CHARLESTON L. REV. 215, 223–32 (2016) (documenting instances of Trump’s appeals
to “racist nativism” and “white nationalism” during his campaign); see also Ta-Nehisi
Coates, My President Was Black, ATLANTIC, Jan.–Feb. 2017, https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/01/my-president-was-black/508793
[https://perma.cc/2LTD-TEN7]; Ta-Nehisi Coates, The First White President,
ATLANTIC, Oct. 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/
the-first-white-president-ta-nehisi-coates/537909 [https://perma.cc/964Q-6CHY].
267. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35 (1983).
268. BEEMAN, supra note 4, at 334.
269. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (representation in the House determined by
the number of “free persons” and “three fifths of all other Persons”); id., art. IV, § 2,
cl. 3 (requiring the return of “escaping” slaves and prohibiting their emancipation).
Euphemisms for slavery that the founders used revealed the shame felt by some, but
mostly showed political calculation looking toward ratification contests in non-slave
states. See BEEMAN, supra note 4, at 213–15, 335.
270. See LEPORE, supra note 110, at 157 (noting the compromise creating the
Electoral College “stood on the back of yet another compromise: the slave ratio”);
Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1145,
1146–47 (2002) (arguing that because the “electoral college” was “based in part on
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until the Civil War. 271 The “proslavery tilt” 272 of the original
Constitution “gave slaveholding regions extra clout in every election as
far as the eye could see—a political gift that kept giving. And growing.”273
At the founding, Pennsylvania and Virginia had an equal number of
free citizens, but Virginia’s count of slaves enabled it to have a stronger
influence in Congress and to dominate early presidential elections. 274
For thirty-two of the first thirty-six years of the republic, presidents
hailed from the slave state of Virginia. 275 An observer in 1812
complained that “one slave in Mississippi has nearly as much power in
Congress, as five free men in . . . New York.” 276 David Walker, a free
black writer and early abolitionist, described the expansion from
thirteen to twenty-four states as “the whites . . . dragging us around in
chains and in handcuffs, to their new States and Territories, to work
their mines and farms, to enrich them and their children.” He was one
of the first to insist that “[t]his country is as much ours as it is the
whites, whether they will admit it now or not . . . .” 277
The problem of national representation included a long-standing
concern about maintaining a “balance” between the slave and free
states. 278 The chronology of admission of states reveals the alternating
the three-fifths clause,” “there is an immediate connection between slavery and the
electoral college”).
271. LEPORE, supra note 110, at 125. Compare Sean Wilentz, Opinion, The Electoral
College Slavery Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2019, at A19 (recanting his previous view that
the Electoral College was designed to entrench slavery), with Akhil Reed Amar,
Opinion, Actually, the Electoral College Was a Pro-Slavery Ploy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/RV8E-7ULE] (arguing the Electoral College was designed to
allow southerners to protect the institution of slavery until the Civil War).
272. See Wilentz, supra note 271.
273. AMAR, supra note 237, at 97.
274. Id. at 158. As a result, “no prominent antislavery leader” was elected president
or appointed to the cabinet until the Lincoln administration. Id. (quoting DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SLAVEHOLDING SOUTH
54 (1989)).
275. The Presidents Timeline, WHITE HOUSE HIST. ASS’N, https://www.whitehouse
history.org/the-presidents-timeline [https://perma.cc/5GTL-URB6] (the exception
was John Adams’s four-year interlude).
276. LEPORE, supra note 110, at 173 (quoting a citizen in Massachusetts).
277. Id. at 204 (quoting Walker).
278. See id. at 235–36 (referring, for example, to President Taylor’s plan to admit
Oregon at the same time as annexing Texas to maintain “the balance of free states to
slave”); see also FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 124, at 282 (describing political
calculations to preserve “the balance of power in the Senate between free and slave
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pattern of slave and free states—until negotiations broke down over
the admission of new states, leading eventually to the Civil War. 279
West Virginia, for example, split from Virginia over the issue of
joining the Confederacy. 280
The very existence of the states themselves and their boundaries
express the inheritance of American slavery. See Table 7 on the next
page. 281

states”); James Oakes, The Great Divide, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 23, 2019),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/05/23/civil-war-history-great-divide
[https://perma.cc/34CH-CUUD] (“The problem with Taylor’s proposal [to add
California as a free state], as Southerners saw it, was that in 1850 there were fifteen
free states and fifteen slave states, and the admission of one more free state would
destroy the ‘equilibrium’ that enabled the slave states to protect themselves, at least
in the Senate, from the increasingly powerful antislavery North.”).
279. See LEPORE, supra note 110, at 266–71; see also DELBANCO, supra note 110, at
323 (recounting a number of causes leading to war, including the persistent divide
about slavery and disputes about new states including Texas, Nebraska, and Kansas);
KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 630 (noting southern states warned in 1850 that admitting
California as a free state threatened to upset “the balance of power” between fifteen
free and fifteen slave states).
280. LEPORE, supra note 110, at 293. Ironically, West Virginia is today one of the
most overrepresented small “white” states. There is also debate about whether West
Virginia is actually constitutional, given that it was created from territory belonging
to another state without its “consent.” See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3; Vasan Kesavan &
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 293
(2002).
281. See DAVIS, supra note 73, at 23–36, 77–78, 87–89, 313, 319; 1 SLAVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES: A SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (Junius P.
Rodriguez ed., 2007); Douglas Harper, Introduction, SLAVERY NORTH (2003),
http://slavenorth.com/index.html [https://perma.cc/E3NX-KS3N].
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Table 7: Chronology of the State Admissions Prior to the Civil War
State
1. Delaware
2. Pennsylvania
3. New Jersey
4. Georgia
5. Connecticut
6. Massachusetts
7. Maryland
8. South Carolina
9. New Hampshire
10. Virginia
11. New York
12. North Carolina
13. Rhode Island
14. Vermont
15. Kentucky
16. Tennessee
17. Ohio
18. Louisiana
19. Indiana
20. Mississippi
21. Illinois
22. Alabama
23. Maine
24. Missouri
25. Arkansas
26. Michigan
27. Florida
28. Texas
29. Iowa
30. Wisconsin
31. California
32. Minnesota
33. Oregon
34. Kansas
35. West Virginia

Date of Admission
1787
1787
1787
1788
1788
1788
1788
1788
1788
1788
1788
1789
1790
1791
1792
1796
1803
1812
1816
1817
1818
1819
1820
1821
1836
1837
1845
1845
1846
1846
1850
1858
1859
1861
1863

Historical Context *
Slave state †
Free state a
Free state b
Slave state ††
Free state c
Free state d
Slave state †
Slave state ††
Free state e
Slave state ††
Free state f
Slave state ††
Free state c
Free state g
Slave state †
Slave state ††
Free state h
Slave state ††
Free state h
Slave state ††
Free state h
Slave state ††
Free state d
Slave state †
Slave state ††
Free state h
Slave state ††
Slave state ††
Free state
Free state h
Free state i
Free state
Free state
Free state i
Slave state †
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* The generalizations of “free” and “slave” do not account for many variations in
the legal status of slavery in various states, as some of the specific notes indicate.
† Border states that remained in the union during the Civil War.
†† The eleven Confederate States of America.
a
Pennsylvania adopted a gradual emancipation law in 1780 and forbid its citizens
from engaging in the slave trade in 1788.
b
New Jersey adopted a gradual emancipation law in 1804.
c
Connecticut and Rhode Island adopted gradual emancipation laws in 1784, and
they forbade their citizens from engaging in the slave trade in 1787 and 1788,
respectively.
d
The Massachusetts Supreme Court removed legal support for slavery in 1783.
Maine was part of Massachusetts at the time.
e
New Hampshire adopted a statute interpreted to end slavery in 1857.
f
New York forbade its citizens from engaging in the slave trade in 1788 and
adopted a gradual emancipation law in 1799.
g
Vermont outlawed slavery in its constitution in 1777.
h
The Northwest Ordinance in 1787 banned slavery in the territories that became
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Several of these states, however,
adopted legal restrictions against black migration.
i
The admissions of California and Kansas as free states triggered the so-called
“imbalances” that led in part to the Civil War.

With respect to constitutional interpretation, this history teaches
that we should not valorize the states—and we should not put them
on a pedestal of an uncritical federalism.
Most states were created within a constitutional framework that
abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison called “a covenant with death.” 282
Even though others such as Frederick Douglass argued that the
Constitution was “[n]ot a proslavery instrument,” it remains true that
half the states—including the original thirteen—were formed within
a framework that promoted slavery. 283 The thirty-five states formed

282. BLIGHT, supra note 55, at 215 (quoting Garrison); see also FINKELMAN, supra
note 110, at 3 (noting that Garrison also called the Constitution “an agreement with
Hell”).
283. BLIGHT, supra note 50, at 215 (quoting Douglass); see also BEEMAN, supra note
4, at 333–34 (noting pro-slavery consequences of the Constitution); Noah Feldman,
Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 883 (2005) (“The Constitution in its
earliest form can be understood as a deal between northern and southern elites to
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before the Civil War had their borders drawn with “color lines” of
“slave” and “free.” 284
Geographical distributions of diverse populations reflected patterns of
original settlement as well as later migrations. 285 Racial violence,
including lynching and mass murder, drove some of these migrations. 286
“The problem of the twenty-first century,” as historian David Blight
writes, “is still some agonizingly enduring combination of legacies
bleeding forward from slavery and color lines.” 287
Only after the cataclysm of the Civil War were the Three Fifths and
Fugitive Slave Clauses superseded, and representation in the House
reverted to “whole people” rather than fractions. 288 Union armies
followed by national policies of Reconstruction Republicans
destroyed the Confederate ideologies of “states’ rights” and “white
supremacy” (at least temporarily). 289 Former slaves became citizens
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and for a brief
time during Reconstruction, black men voted and ran for office in the
south—with over 800 of them serving in state legislatures and more
than 1000 in local governments. 290 By 1870, fifteen percent of
southern officials were black. 291

tighten (‘perfect’) a mutually beneficial political union. That is why the Constitution
preserved African slavery.”).
284. See supra Table 7; BLIGHT, supra note 55, at 759 (quoting W.E.B. Du Bois: “The
problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line”).
285. See Kevin E. McHugh, Black Migration Reversal in the United States, 77
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 171, 171 (1987) (describing how the inequality of racial and
ethnic distribution among the states results in part from ongoing migrations,
particularly of black populations first out of the south, and then back again in
response to complex social, political, and economic dynamics).
286. See, e.g., Stewart E. Tolnay & E. M. Beck, Racial Violence and Black Migration in
the American South, 1910 to 1930, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 103, 105 (1992) (finding violence
to be a causal explanation for the Great Migration of blacks northward in the early
twentieth century).
287. BLIGHT, supra note 50, at 764.
288. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (apportionment in the House by “whole
number of persons”); LEPORE, supra note 110, at 320.
289. LEPORE, supra note 110, at 290; cf. Berman, supra note 109, at 1390 (observing
that “white supremacy” once had status as a constitutional principle, but no longer
does).
290. LEPORE, supra note 110, at 323; see also FONER, supra note 138, at 351–64
(describing black participation in government).
291. ALEXANDER, supra note 263, at 29.
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But the Reconstruction did not last long. President Lincoln had
hoped for “a new birth of freedom” and “a government of the people,
by the people, for the people.” 292 Congress passed a Civil Rights Act
in 1866. 293
Reconstruction Republicans pushed through the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Then came a
counter-reaction, ironically called the Redemption, and white
southern Democrats returned to power. White terrorist lynching by
the Ku Klux Klan and the adoption of Jim Crow laws set back progress
on racial equality for another century. 294 In the words of W.E.B. Du
Bois, “the slave went free, stood a brief moment in the sun; then
moved back again toward slavery.” 295 Even the New Deal depended
on a devil’s bargain with white southern “Dixiecrats.” 296
This history challenges any interpretation of the cold text of the
original Constitution asserting that we must uphold the integrity and
independence of the states against the demands of progress for
greater and deeper respect for the equal voting rights of individuals,
especially regarding race and color.
Remember in this history, too, the sordid role played by the
Supreme Court. In United States v Cruikshank, 297 the Court restrained
the federal government from pursuing prosecutions under the
Enforcement Act of 1870 against mass murders of black citizens
committed by white supremacists in Louisiana. 298 Dred Scott v.
292. Lincoln, supra note 82.
293. LEPORE, supra note 110, at 319–20 (noting an override of President Andrew
Johnson’s veto was required).
294. See ALEXANDER, supra note 263, at 30–35 (chronicling the birth and legacy of
the Jim Crow laws); see also Feldman, supra note 283, at 884 (noting how the post-Civil
War amendments were reinterpreted “to authorize the exclusion of African
Americans from equal rights,” and “[i]t was not until almost a century later . . . that
the time had come to impose equal rights once again”).
295. See FONER, supra note 138, at 602 (quoting Du Bois).
296. See IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME
9–10 (2013) (describing the pact Roosevelt made with white southern Democrats).
297. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
298. See id. at 556–57, 559; see also FONER, supra note 138, at 437, 530 (observing
that an estimated 230 black people were murdered on Easter Sunday in the Colfax
massacre that spawned the case, “the bloodiest single act of carnage in all of
Reconstruction”); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS
AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 87–90 (1996) (describing
Cruikshank as a key component in “the judicial betrayal of African Americans” in
which “white supremacists received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court”); Martha
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Sandford 299 and Plessy v. Ferguson 300 rank among the most racist
decisions ever issued. 301 In Plessy, the Court upheld the noxious
“separate but equal” doctrine that was used to justify segregation in
the south long after the Civil War had been fought and ostensibly won
by the north. 302 The Court’s decision in Dred Scott was even worse. It
knocked aside a congressional compromise, found slaves to have no
constitutional rights at all, and set spark to the fire of war.303 This sorry
history of judicial racism should counsel any future Court to tread
carefully before striking down a statute such as the Senate Reform Act
designed in part to correct historical and present racial injustices.304
The strongest historical argument against the reform is that the one
state, two senators rule resulted originally from the Connecticut

T. McCluskey, Facing the Ghost of Cruikshank in Constitutional Law, 65 J. LEG. EDUC.
278, 280–81 (2015) (finding that Cruikshank and related decisions “cleared the way
for violent restoration of a white supremacist legal order that replaced
Reconstruction with the Jim Crow system of segregation, inequality, and racial
violence that reigned largely unchecked by the Court for nearly a century”).
299. 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
300. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
301. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 298, at 117 (“From a race-relations standpoint,
Plessy v. Ferguson was one of the two most venal decisions ever handed down by the
United States Supreme Court [equaled only by Dred Scott].”); see also Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–20 (1944) (upholding war-time internment of
Japanese-Americans), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
302. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (using the “separate but
equal” language in dissent from the holding allowing racial segregation on railroad
cars). Even in dissent, Justice Harlan exhibited racist bias, writing that whites are
dominant “in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power,” and
“will continue to be for all time.” See id. at 559; Balkin, supra note 144, at 2329
(quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559) (noting that Harlan believed white superiority would
remain regardless of racial equality).
303. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404–05 (holding that black slaves constituted “a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant
race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and
had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government
might choose to grant them”); see also DELBANCO, supra note 110, at 329–35, 346
(describing the contribution of the Dred Scott decision to the Civil War); Robert M.
Cover, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1003–07 (1968) (reviewing RICHARD
HILDRETH, ATROCIOUS JUDGES: LIVES OF JUDGES INFAMOUS AS TOOLS OF TYRANTS AND
INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION (1856)).
304. See supra Table 4 (showing present racial injustice in Senate representation);
supra Section III.A (urging judicial restraint).
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Compromise between large and small states. 305 Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia accounted for forty-five percent of the
population at the founding, and a practical deal accommodated the
smaller states. 306
However, the motivation for this compromise was not to assure any
long-term balance between small and large states—which might
otherwise support an originalist interpretation in favor of the one
state, two senators rule today. “Senate seats were allocated to States
on an equal basis,” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recently observed,
“to respect state sovereignty and increase the odds that the smaller
States would ratify the Constitution.” 307 The deal placated the small
states who had the power to hold up the larger ones. 308 Small, closedin “four-sided” states such as Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey feared
the consequences of westward expansion of open-ended “three-sided”
states led by Virginia.309 Today, more than two centuries of history have
filled in the continental map, obviating this original concern.
In addition, the Connecticut Compromise cannot be separated
from other compromises made regarding slavery. The most serious
conflicts at the founding involved debates over slavery and not largeversus-small states. 310 In Madison’s words, “the States were divided
305. See supra notes 5 & 26 and accompanying text.
306. See LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 32–35.
307. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1130 (2016).
308. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 10–17 (1964) (describing details about
the compromise and Benjamins Franklin’s encouragement to “join in some
accom[m]odating proposition”). One delegate denounced the negotiations as “a
small states’ power grab.” KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 187 (paraphrasing Hugh
Williamson of North Carolina); see also BEEMAN, supra note 4, at 355 (asserting that
the small states wielded their power successfully in part because the one colony, one
vote rule under the Articles of Confederation was also employed as the decision rule
at the Constitutional Convention, against the wishes of some Pennsylvania delegates
who wanted to change the rules of decision at the start so that “each state’s votes in
the Convention” would be “weighed according to its population”).
309. See LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 34–35; see also KLARMAN, supra note 4,
at 190–92 (discussing issues of western lands).
310. Both James Madison and James Wilson objected strenuously to the
Connecticut Compromise throughout the Constitutional Convention. William
Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 981
(2008). At one point, a frustrated Wilson, arguing that the small states had no good
theory to support their view, foretold that an error in “concoction” of the founding
plan of representation “must be followed by disease, convulsions, and finally death
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into different interests not by their difference in size, but by other
circumstances, the most material of which resulted . . . principally
from the effects of their having or not having slaves.” 311 The one state,
two senators rule was part and parcel of larger compromises
concerning slavery, including the Three Fifths Clause giving slave
states outsized influence in Congress until the Civil War. In this
context, one historian concluded that “the cloud of slavery”
combined with the “ambiguity of the part-national/part-federal”
Connecticut Compromise likely helped to cause the Civil War “by
distorting the sectional balance of power in Congress for decades and
by allowing both sides of the war to portray their political claims to
sovereignty as legitimate.” 312
At a minimum, the origins of the Connecticut Compromise within
a pro-slavery representational structure, as well as its subsequent
ideological history as a justification for “states’ rights” claims in and after
the Civil War, reveal no good political theory for the one state, two senators
rule. Madison was right.313 Failure to adopt a scheme of national
representation of citizens apportioned by relative population in the Senate
contributed to a terrible war, and this legacy still polarizes the nation with
uneven representation and racial dysfunctionality. This history supports
the following legal analogy: Just as the voting-rights amendments
cancelled pro-slavery and sexist provisions in the original
Constitution, so too a statutory reform grounded in the same voting-

itself.” Id. (quoting Wilson). Alexander Hamilton agreed: “There can be no truer
principle than this—that every individual in the community at large has an equal
right to the protection of government. If therefore three states contain a majority of
the inhabitants of America, ought they to be governed by a minority?” LEE &
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 32 (quoting Hamilton)).
311. DELBANCO, supra note 110, at 65 (quoting Madison); see also ALEXANDER, supra
note 263, at 25 (“The structure and content of the original Constitution was based
largely on the effort to preserve a racial caste system—slavery—while at the same time
affording political and economic rights to whites, especially propertied whites. The
southern slaveholding colonies would agree to form a union only on the condition
that the federal government would not be able to interfere with the right to own
slaves.”); Amar, supra note 271 (“As James Madison made clear at the Constitutional
Convention in 1787 in Philadelphia, the big political divide in America was not
between big and small states; it was between North and South and was all about
slavery.”).
312. BEEMAN, supra note 4, at 225.
313. See supra notes 5 & 311 and accompanying text.
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rights amendments and narrowly tailored to protect equal voting
rights should override the original one state, two senators rule.
It is admittedly rare to allow a statute, even when grounded in
power derived from later constitutional amendments, to contravene
an original constitutional rule. 314 However, the Lockean paradox
created by Article V’s anti-amendment provision, which was added
almost as an afterthought at the Constitutional Convention after a
very long, hot summer of hard work, leaves no choice but to bite the
bullet. 315 Our founding ancestors whom we most respect, including
Madison, Hamilton, and Wilson, would, if they were alive, nod their
heads in approval. 316
Historical path dependence, then, rather than any viable theory of
representation is the primary explanation for the one state, two
senators rule. 317 The Connecticut Compromise, forged on the basis

314. Again, the Seventeenth Amendment supplies a precedent. Changing the
selection of senators to popular voting empowered states and the federal government
to adopt statutes that contravened the previous constitutional rule of selection by
state legislatures. See STRAUSS, supra note 41, at 132–35; see also supra notes 169–70
and accompanying text. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (declaring that
senators are elected by the people), with id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing that senators
are chosen by state legislatures).
315. See BEEMAN, supra note 4, at 355 (noting that this last-minute addition, in
Madison’s words, was “dictated by the circulating murmurs of the small states” and
adopted “without debate”); KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 201 (describing the same
history on “the penultimate day of the convention’s proceedings”). See also supra Part
I.
316. See supra notes 5 & 310; see also KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 182–87, 198–99
(recounting arguments against the one state, two senators rule by Madison and
Hamilton and their dire predictions about it).
Some features of the Senate Reform Act recommended here appeared in different
form as arguments at the Constitutional Convention. See KLARMAN, supra note 4, at
200, 207–08. For example, James Wilson argued for a minimum of one senator per
state in a population-based proposal for representation, and Charles Pinckney argued
at one point for a “sliding scale by which the smallest states would get a single senator
and the largest state, Virginia, would receive five.” Id.
317. See LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 43 (“Equal state apportionment
persists not because it serves any current function, but as a path-dependent
consequence of [an] initial agreement [made] more than two hundred years ago.”);
see also Robertson, supra note 5, at 240 (describing the original Constitution not as
“the product of a systematic philosophical plan, but the by-product of a pathdependent sequence of political compromises largely forced on Madison and his
allies by their Convention opponents”).
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of interest rather than principle, 318 is too weak a reed to support the
representational unfairness in the Senate, which has multiplied more
than six-fold since the founding, especially in light of later constitutional
amendments protecting equal voting rights of U.S. citizens.319
An opponent might argue also that the one state, two senators rule
shields states from overreaching by the national government. 320 The
proposed reform, however, shifts power, in federalist terms, only
among the states, and not in terms of empowering of the national
government against the states.
If anything, greater power
accumulated in a fewer number of states may increase the power of
the states vis-à-vis the national government. 321
In addition, even if one accepts an originalist argument in favor of
the one state, two senators rule, the historical context reflects an
intramodal conflict that parallels the one in textual analysis. 322 An
318. See KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 182–87 (providing an account of the
compromises regarding representation, including cross-cutting interests of smallversus-large and slave-versus-free states); KRAMER, supra note 113, at 621 (noting that
“a number of scholars have concluded that the New Jersey Plan must have been a
ploy to force concessions rather than a serious alternative proposal”); LEE &
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 33 (finding that “the small-state delegates were
motivated by their own states’ particular interests rather than by an adherence to
principle”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (Sept. 5, 1816), in
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 2, at 367–69 (observing that “our state
[of Virginia] is allowed a larger representation on account of [its] slaves but every
one knows that [the] constitution was a matter of compromise, a capitulation
between conflicting interests and opinions”); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
574 (1964) (explaining that the “compromise between the larger and smaller States
on this matter averted a deadlock in the Constitutional Convention which had
threatened to abort the birth of our Nation”). But see Fried, supra note 25, at 996
(arguing that “the Connecticut Compromise was not just a bargain; it was a
conception” that recalled “the original conception of the nation, embodied in the
Articles of Confederation, [that] was something like a multilateral treaty concluded
between independent sovereigns”).
319. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text; see also supra Section III.C.1.
320. Cf. DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, 1776–2015 60 (rev. ed. 2016) (arguing that “Article V evinced the
essential compromise struck between the proponents of a strong central government
and the advocates of retained state power”).
321. See supra text accompanying notes 200–01.
322. See Section III.C.3.
It is questionable whether “original intent” in
constitutional interpretation should be taken as dispositive. See, e.g., FALLON, supra
note 108, at 133–34, 137–41 (describing different versions of originalism and arguing
that reference to “moral rights” and other values is often necessary even under an
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originalist interpretation must account for the intentions and
meaning also of those who passed the various voting-rights
amendments. They could not have imagined a future Congress
passing a Senate Reform Act specifically, but they authorized
Congress to pass legislation broadly “appropriate” to protect equal
voting rights. 323 As the historian Eric Foner concludes, “the
[Fourteenth] Amendment’s central principle remained constant: a
national guarantee of equality before the law.” 324

originalist approach); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 122–69
(1988) (arguing that originalism cannot give voice to aspirational democratic
constitutional values); STRAUSS, supra note 41, at 17–30 (critiquing “Originalism and
its sins”); 1 TRIBE, supra note 124, at 48–49 (arguing that though one should take
“original meaning as [a] starting point,” constitutional interpretation requires other
modes of analysis); Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 329
(2013) (finding that various versions of originalism fail to provide either fixed or
constrained meanings in interpretation); Berman, supra note 109, at 1340–47
(describing different theories of originalism and finding even the best one “does not
jibe well with any widely entertained general theory of law”); Heidi Kitrosser,
Interpretive Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459, 459 (2016) (criticizing various versions of
originalism as indeterminate); Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 907–11, 916 (2008) (criticizing “original intent
originalism,” sometimes referred to as plain meaning originalism, as neither
historically coherent nor pragmatic); Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the
Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 576
(2011) (describing the criticisms of various elaborations of originalism).
Comparatively, originalist theories of constitutional interpretation seem to have
found purchase in only a few other national jurisdictions, including Malaysia,
Singapore, and Turkey. See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 75, at 1669–70 & n.127
(collecting sources).
323. See supra notes 137 & 158 and accompanying text.
324. FONER, supra note 138, at 257; see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 5, 8 (1988) (noting an
intention to express broad “general principles of equality, individual rights, and local
self-rule”); Paul Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black
Hole of Constitutional Law, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1019, 1026 (2014) (“Virtually all
supporters of supporters of the Amendment agreed that it would protect the ‘civil
rights’ of blacks and everyone else.”). In general, the “game” of figuring out the
intentions of those who wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment has been
shown to be substantively indeterminate. See NELSON, supra, at 5. Justice Alito,
recognizing the huge inequality of representation in the Senate, pointed out in dicta
that the Fourteenth Amendment was negotiated “in the shadow” of this inequality
and did nothing expressly to address it. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1144 &
n.4 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring). He does not, however, suggest that an affirmative
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Just as “time’s arrow” favors the later constitutional rule in textual
interpretation, so should the historical force of the voting-rights
amendments hold sway. The founders had no better foresight than
those who enacted the voting-rights amendments. As two scholars
observe:
In their wildest dreams the framers of the Constitution never
imagined that the population of the United States would someday
approach [and exceed] 300 million. Nor did they imagine that a
single state—on the Pacific coast of the continent, no less—would
have a population almost ten times that of the entire country at the
first census . . . . The entire country in 1790 had roughly the same
population as Connecticut today. 325

The grossly unequal representation of the contemporary Senate
was not foreseen by either the founders or those who wrote and
ratified the voting-rights amendments, but the latter empowered
Congress to act on principle to protect against this kind of development.
A Senate Reform Act would set a positive trajectory into the future
for the national protection of equal voting rights. If adopted, one
hopes a future Supreme Court would choose not to trample again on
the long-term narrative of enhancing democracy in America. If it did,
then one may recall the words Frederick Douglass. “The Supreme
Court of the United States is not the only power in the world,” he said
in the aftermath of Dred Scott, for “the Supreme Court of the Almighty
is greater.” 326 The Court “could not change the essential nature of
things, making evil good, and good evil.” 327
F. Moral Principle
If textual analysis poses the highest hurdle of constitutional
interpretation for the proposed reform, the question of moral
principle is probably the lowest. It is difficult to conceive of an
objection to the reform on moral or ethical grounds—other than
maybe an unarticulated preference for “settled expectations” or
use of congressional power authorized by the voting-rights amendments should be
limited for this reason. Id. at 1123, 1130–33.
325. See, e.g., LEE & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 5, at 44; see also BEEMAN, supra note 4,
at xi (observing that none of the founders “could have imagined the goliath of a
nation that America was to become”).
326. BLIGHT, supra note 55, at 279 (quoting Douglass).
327. Id.
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“governmental regularity.” 328 Presented with evidence of gross voting
inequality, we should simply follow Spike Lee’s advice and “do the
right thing.” 329
Scholars in many disciplines agree that “quantitative” equality is an
important value. 330 “Today,” as Robert Dahl says, “we have come to
assume that democracy must guarantee virtually every adult citizen
the right to vote.” 331
It is also true that “equality” standing alone amounts to an “empty
idea.” 332 We must have a theory for why equality in voting matters,
and this theory should include concepts of human dignity and selfrespect, as well as equal opportunity to participate in the selfgovernance of elections. 333
328. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 124, at 6, 14 (demonstrating that models of “settled
expectations” and “governmental regularity” are in tension with those of “equal
protection” and “structural justice”).
As Tribe argues, however, “settled
expectations” and “government regularity” give only “an appearance of neutrality
and objectivity.” Id. at 14. Closer analysis shows them to be based “for the most part
on an illusion,” and “the edifice of doctrine built on the ideals of respecting
expectations and acting with regularity has been defensible only in terms of rarely
articulated substantive beliefs.” Id. Moreover, “[t]o the extent that the models
genuinely avoid reliance on such beliefs, they prove circular, or empty, or both.” Id.
329. DO THE RIGHT THING (Universal Pictures 1989).
330. See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 141 (1989) (“[T]he meaning of quantitative fairness has become a settled
matter: it requires adherence to the precept ‘one person, one vote.’”).
331. ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 3 (2d ed. 2015).
332. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 540, 592 (1982)
(arguing that all arguments based on equality should be translated into concepts of
rights). Accepting Westen’s argument would not damage the moral case for “equality
of voting rights,” because one can formulate the argument in terms of the “voting
rights” that every person should possess as a citizen. If some citizens’ votes are
significantly diminished as compared to others’ votes, then the “right” to have a say
in government is diminished, and the situation should be corrected to achieve
fairness in the use of one’s right to vote.
333. DAHL, supra note 331, at 63–67, 76–78 (arguing for a conception of “intrinsic
equality” supported also by the world’s major religions, as well as a value of
“inclusion”); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) (holding
“the right to vote” in federal elections to be “fundamental” based on “the equal
weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter”); SIDNEY
HOOK, REASON, SOCIAL MYTHS, AND DEMOCRACY 285, 294 (1940) (“A democratic
society is one where the government rests upon the freely given consent of the
governed,” and this includes values embracing “the belief that every individual
should be regarded as possessing intrinsic worth or dignity”); Berman, supra note
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In addition, a theory of political equality in voting assumes some
other factors, such as voters’ basic cognitive competence. Voters need
civic education to understand what is at stake in elections and why
they matter. For good political outcomes, more than quantitative
equality to participate is required because inequality of wealth or
other social imbalances in conditions can skew political outcomes,
especially if voters do not have the capacity to think for themselves. 334
In law, the principle of equal voting rights expresses general values
of “equal treatment” and “treating like cases alike,” even if the values
are not self-executing. 335 As Justice Antonin Scalia said, “the
appearance of equal treatment” is one of the “most substantial” values
in the law. 336 He continued:
As a motivating force of the human spirit, that value cannot be
overestimated. Parents know that children will accept quite readily
all sorts of arbitrary substantive dispositions—no television in the
afternoon, or no television in the evening, or even no television at
all. But try to let one brother or sister watch television when the
others do not, and you will feel the fury of the fundamental sense
of justice unleashed. The Equal Protection Clause epitomizes
justice more than any other provision of the Constitution. 337

109, at 1334, 1406 (highlighting “human dignity” as a fundamental constitutional
principle).
334. See Thomas Christiano, Deliberative Equality and Democratic Order, in POLITICAL
ORDER: NOMOS XXXVIII 251, 253, 257–66 (Ian Shapiro & Russell Hardin eds., 1996)
(arguing that “political equality” is “a core ideal” in democratic decision-making
because it “lends legitimacy to its outcomes” and provides “a just way of resolving
certain kinds of conflicts of interest” and deliberations about views of the common
good).
335. George Wright has argued:
The basic idea of treating like cases alike, and unlike cases unlike, has a
distinguished pedigree. Whether justice precisely requires such a universal
principle has been doubted. But even if we assume the applicability of such
a principle in equal protection cases, the principle in itself provides little
useful guidance. It simply requires the production of some reason for
treating any group less favorably than any other group, with no further
guidance as to what should count as a sufficient reason for any form or
degree of inequality.
R. George Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality, 34 L. & INEQ. 1, 8 (2016).
336. See Scalia, supra note 105, at 1178.
337. Id.; see also Berman, supra note 109, at 1389 (describing constitutional
principles of equality and liberty).
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An analogous argument applies in the context of voting. How can
it be fair for a citizen to move from California to Nevada or Alaska
and feel their voting weight multiplied by fifteen or fifty times? 338
Does a citizen in New Mexico deserve 13.5 times more say in the
Senate than one across the border in Texas? 339 These discrepancies
are not reconcilable with respect for citizens’ equal rights to vote in
their national government.
Many theories of political order rely on a moral principle of voting
equality. Consider John Rawls’ theory of justice as an example.340 For
Rawls, a just political order relies on “a just constitution” that establishes “a
just procedure arranged to ensure a just outcome.”341 To this end, “the
liberties of equal citizenship must be incorporated into and protected by
the constitution,” and “these liberties include . . . equal political rights.”342
Specifically, Rawls articulates a “principle of (equal) participation” that
“requires that all citizens . . . have an equal right to take part in, and to
determine the outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes the
laws with which they are to comply.”343 He continues: “Justice as fairness
begins with the idea that where common principles are necessary and to
everyone’s advantage, they are to be worked out from the viewpoint of a
suitably defined initial situation of equality in which each person is fairly
represented.”344 “All sane adults,” Rawls concludes, “have the right to take

338. See DAHL, supra note 331, at 48–50, 144 (describing this difference as a “gross
inequality in representation”).
339. See supra Table 1.
340. E.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
341. Id. at 173.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 194.
344. Id. at 194–95. There are limits and complications. It is fair to ask, for
example, whether the right to vote should be granted at the age of sixteen rather
than eighteen, and whether resident non-citizens should sometimes have a right to
vote. The House recently rejected a proposal to expand the franchise to sixteen-yearolds. John Nichols, Let the 16-Year-Olds Who Are Marching for the Planet Vote to Save It,
NATION (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/voting-age-16-climatestrike-green-new-deal-ayanna-pressley [https://perma.cc/QE2U-E59Q]. On the
question of non-citizen suffrage, see, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens:
The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1391, 1394 (1993). With respect to equal voting rights, a “threshold level of some
relevant capability” regarding age, sanity, or citizenship is ordinarily thought to mean
that “[a]bove that threshold level, any differences among persons in maturity,
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part in political affairs, and the precept of one elector one vote is honored as far as
possible. Elections are fair and free, and regularly held.”345
Other philosophers agree that equal representation is a basic value.
One may disagree with Rawls about how far to go in order to achieve
political equality, but there is little controversy over the formal
requirement of equal voting rights. “Democratic equality,” according to
one survey, “embraces the norm that law-makers and top public officials
should be selected in democratic elections. All mentally competent adult
citizens should be eligible to vote and run for office in free elections . . . in
which all votes count equally and majority rule prevails.”346
The moral principle of equal voting rights finds wide agreement in
different schools of thought. 347 Deontologists and social contract
theorists emphasize the need for voting to express rights of human
dignity and the pursuit of one’s vision of the good life for oneself and
the common good. 348 Utilitarian and welfare theorists see equal
voting as a means of expressing interests and preferences to aggregate
them fairly into an overall measurement of social good and
happiness. 349 Libertarians agree that everyone should have a right to
protect their property and advance their interests on a legally equal
basis with others. 350 All of these moral theories converge in
supporting a principle of equal voting rights for individuals.
One objection may recall “states’ rights” theories of federalism.
According to this objection, the equal rights that citizens may claim in the

informedness, interest, experiences, integrity, and sagacity would be irrelevant.”
Wright, supra note 335, at 21.
345. RAWLS, supra note 340, at 195 (emphasis added).
346. Richard Arneson, Egalitarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., (last updated
Apr. 24, 2013), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism [https://perma.
cc/52LU-BMKN] (emphasis added).
347. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 297 (1986) (describing different
philosophical perspectives in terms of the idea of equality).
348. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 340, at 194–95.
349. Id. at 193; see also David Miller, Democracy’s Domain, 37 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 201,
205 (2009) (describing a form of “liberal democracy” that “promotes welfare by
ensuring that political decisions track the aggregate interests of its constituency”).
350. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). But cf.
H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 831–36 (1979)
(describing Nozick’s theory and arguing that it is too limited in its focus on negative
rights and ignores distributional concerns).
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United States extend primarily to their rights as citizens of their respective
states, and not citizens of the United States.
The Supreme Court in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton351 raised this
issue tangentially in striking down, in a five-to-four opinion, an Arkansas
law imposing term limits on U.S. senators and representatives.352 Writing
for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that “sovereignty is vested
in the people, and that sovereignty confers on the people the right to
choose freely their representatives to the National Government.” 353
In a long dissenting opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas objected that the
“Constitution simply does not recognize any mechanism for action by the
undifferentiated people of the Nation.”354 He added:
[T]he notion of popular sovereignty that undergirds the Constitution
does not erase state boundaries, but rather tracks them. The people of
each State obviously did trust their fate to the people of the several States
when they consented to the Constitution; not only did they empower
the governmental institutions of the United States, but they also agreed
to be bound by constitutional amendments that they themselves refused
to ratify. See Art. V . . . . At the same time, however, the people of each
State retained their separate political identities. As Chief Justice
Marshall put it, ‘[n]o political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of
breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding
the American people into one common mass.’355

Nevertheless, it is no dream that the Civil War and subsequent
amendments altered the constitutional landscape and established federal
voting rights operative on the national government as well as the states.356
Recall the universal language used in the voting-rights amendments:
“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State.”357 “We the People” of the
351. 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
352. Id. at 783.
353. Id. at 794.
354. Id. at 848 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
355. Id. at 849 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403
(1819)).
356. See supra Section III.E. But cf. Maeve Glass, Citizens of the State, 85 U. CHI. L.
REV. 865, 865 (2018) (describing the importance of state citizenship in the
abolitionist movement against slavery).
357. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text; see also Seth F. Kreimer, Lines
in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973,
983–84 (2002) (observing that “national citizenship” has been “primary” over “state
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United States are acting in this declaration, and delegating power to protect
our voting rights to Congress and not the states (or, frankly, the Supreme
Court). Note, also, that senators swear an oath to “support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic,” and “bear true faith and allegiance to the same.”358 U.S.
senators owe their constitutional duties to their constituents as citizens of
the United States.
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence in Term Limits sounds the
right note of compromise: Americans are citizens of both the United
States and their individual states. In Kennedy’s words,
Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the
atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens
would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each
protected from incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution
created a legal system unprecedented in form and design,
establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct
relationship, . . . its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the
people who sustain it and are governed by it. 359

A Senate Reform Act would redeem the voting rights of U.S.
citizens. It respects federalism and applies the moral and political
principle of equal voting rights at a national level for national elections.
G. Legal Doctrine
Last but not least, the proposed reform finds support in legal
doctrine announced in Supreme Court precedents. The Senate
Reform Act would follow in the same path as the Voting Rights Act of
1965, with Congress focusing on the governing structure of the
United States itself rather than the states. 360
citizenship” ever since the Civil War and the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
358. The Oath We Take, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/generic/Feature_Homepage_TheOathWeTake.htm
[https://perma.cc/YG6X-9TW3].
359. 514 U.S. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship
in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 199–200 (2000) (describing federalism as “a
system that divides political authority between a nation-state and sub-national polities
within its territory so that both the national and sub-national polities directly govern
individuals within their jurisdiction, and that confers both national and sub-national
citizenships”).
360. See supra notes 177 & 189 and accompanying text.
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The most relevant cases are those that upheld congressional
authority to promulgate the Voting Rights Act. In South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 361 the Court rejected claims by a state that the Voting
Rights Act exceeded the constitutional authority of Congress under
the Fifteenth Amendment. 362 South Carolina argued that “the
principle of the equality of States” meant Congress could not adopt
measures reaching into state governments to review or supervise
elections. 363 The Court replied by setting forth a principle that
applies also to the proposed reform here.
The language and purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment, the prior
decisions construing its several provisions, and the general
doctrines of constitutional interpretation, all point to one
fundamental principle. As against the reserved powers of the
States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the
constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting. 364

Although more recent cases have questioned the continuing need
for remedial measures under the Voting Rights Act, the constitutional
authority and the “success” of the statute have been reaffirmed. 365
The only difference in an application of this doctrine to a Senate
Reform Act would be that it addresses abridgment “by the United
States” rather than “any state.” 366 The reform aims at the same
substantive problem as the Voting Rights Act: denial or abridgment
of equal voting rights.
When the Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress to legislate,
then its power reaches its zenith. The Court in Katzenbach quoted the
canonical case of McCulloch v. Maryland 367: “Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not

361. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
362. Id. at 308.
363. Id. at 323.
364. Id. at 324.
365. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202–03
(2009) (noting the “success” of the Voting Rights Act while at the same time cutting
back its scope regarding preclearance plans).
366. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
367. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.” 368
The Court in Katzenbach praised Congress for its “inventive
manner” in addressing a recalcitrant historical problem. 369 History is
important because Congress had retreated after Reconstruction and
allowed racist white southerners to reassert power over elections and
voting. 370 Because the Voting Rights Act was part of what has been
correctly called the Second Reconstruction, 371 then a Senate Reform
Act may constitute part of a Third Reconstruction. 372 In any event,
both the Voting Rights Act and the proposed Senate Reform Act aim
at a similar end of voting equality.
In Katzenbach, the Court upheld federal oversight to prohibit
discriminatory impediments to voting such as literacy tests. 373 Other
cases addressed the problem of geographical malapportionment in
state legislatures. In 1962, in Baker v. Carr, 374 the Court found
Tennessee’s legislative scheme to violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 375 The next year, in Gray v. Sanders, 376 the Court struck down
the legislative structure in Georgia. 377 In reviewing the state’s
representational system, the Court asked:
How then can one person be given twice or 10 times the voting
power of another person in a statewide election merely because he
368. 383 U.S. at 326 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421); see also J.M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 973–74
(1998) (discussing McCulloch as a preeminent precedent).
369. 383 U.S. at 327–28.
370. See Section III.E; see also Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 218–22 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recounting post-Reconstruction history
and the need for the Voting Rights Act).
371. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
372. See William J. Barber II, We Are Witnessing the Birth Pangs of a Third
Reconstruction, AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 15, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/rev-barbermoral-change [https://perma.cc/RJU-82Y9] (“We must begin to think in terms of a
Third Reconstruction.”); see also Richard Primus, Second Redemption, Third
Reconstruction, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1987, 1999 (2018) (expressing “the hope for a
healthy American constitutional order” that will work toward creating “nothing less
than a Third Reconstruction”).
373. 383 U.S. at 334.
374. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
375. Id. at 188, 237.
376. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
377. Id. at 381.
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lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural county?
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be
chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have
an equal vote—whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever
their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home
may be in that geographical unit. 378

Geographical disparities that emphasize the votes of rural
populations merely because of their location on a map run afoul the
Equal Protection clause and distort the concept of equal voting rights.
This principle of equal voting rights applies also to the U.S. Senate.
The Court in Gray, with Justice William O. Douglas writing for the
majority, said that “[t]he conception of political equality from the
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only
one thing—one person, one vote.” 379
Then, in 1964, the Court dropped the “bombshell” of Reynolds v.
Sims. 380 In Reynolds, the Court found Alabama’s legislature to be
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 381 Going further
than previous precedents, the Court “minted a new rule that every
district had to be equally populous.” 382 “Legislators represent people,
not trees or acres,” the Court reasoned, following Gray and other
cases. 383 “[I]f a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one
part of the State should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times
the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could
hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the
disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted.” 384 Such a state
electoral system could be easily manipulated, according to the Court,
to disenfranchise some citizens by inflating the importance of

378. Id. at 379.
379. Id. at 381; see also TRIBE, supra note 160, at 120 (stating that “the ‘one person,
one vote’ principle . . . has attained an all but mythical status as a bedrock
constitutional principle on which our democracy is built”).
380. 377 U.S. 533 (1964); AMAR, supra note 135, at 194.
381. 377 U.S. at 547.
382. AMAR, supra note 135, at 193–94.
383. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
384. Id.
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others. 385 In one stroke, the Court knocked out more than forty state
electoral systems as unconstitutionally unequal. 386
My argument here is not that the U.S. Senate can or should be struck
down as unconstitutional in a case brought by private citizens or the
states acting on their behalf. 387 The current structure of the Senate
violates the principle of equal voting rights of citizens, but it does not
follow that a free-standing constitutional claim should be justiciable.
The federal courts should, in my view, decline to entertain such a
challenge because it would create an impractical and unwise conflict
between the courts and the political branches. If the Supreme Court
ordered reform of the Senate, it would set up an untenable power
contest, and courts should therefore deny standing in these cases on
grounds of the political question doctrine. 388
In addition, without an affirmative act of Congress, no intramodal
textual constitutional conflict is presented.389 The distinction between
“constitutional construction” and “constitutional interpretation” helps
to explain the difference.390 If and when Congress adopts a Senate
Reform Act, then it would construct the meaning of the voting-rights
amendments, and courts should then defer to that construction, perhaps
even adopting the doctrine of “clear mistake.”391 In the absence of
385. Id.; see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (striking down
Georgia’s apportionment of U.S. congressional districts in which two or three times
more citizens were placed in some districts than others and arguing that “as nearly as
is practicable one person’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as
another’s”).
386. AMAR, supra note 135, at 194; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 268
(reporting Senator Strom Thurmond’s lament that Reynolds had invalidated the
apportionment systems of at least forty-four states).
387. But cf. AMAR, supra note 135, at 197 (“If the Court could on one day say that
most states had unconstitutional governments that required major restructuring after
the next census, what was to stop the Court from saying the same thing the next day
about the Senate?”).
388. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. But cf. William S. Bailey,
Comment, Reducing Malapportionment in Japan’s Electoral Districts: The Supreme Court
Must Act, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 169, 174–81 (1997) (discussing Japanese cases
striking down national legislative structures as excessively unequal).
389. See supra Section III.C.3.
390. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 549, 566–69 (2009) (examining the roles of Congress and the President in
constitutional construction).
391. See supra note 108–09 and accompanying text.
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congressional action, the textual meaning of the voting-rights amendments
regarding congressional apportionment is much less determinate.392
Nonetheless, the legal principles of voting equality and fairness
enunciated in cases such as Baker, Gray, and Reynolds apply with similar
persuasive force to the proposed reform. Recall that the levels of
mathematical inequality of representation in the U.S. Senate today
are much higher than the ratios struck down in these cases against
the states. Compared with inequality in the Senate dividing the
smallest and largest states in a ratio close to seventy-to-one, the ratios of
voting inequality in some of the state legislative cases seem quaint.393
More recent cases are not to the contrary. In Bush v. Gore, 394 for
example, the Supreme Court intervened in a state recount of votes in
a presidential election and applied an equal protection rationale to
protect voters’ rights. Ostensibly, the Court acted to protect all
Florida voters from unequal treatment in recounting votes in a close
federal election. 395 The case has been criticized as result-oriented:
five Republican-appointed justices holding in favor of the Republican
candidate. 396 At a minimum, though, the Court in Bush v. Gore
followed in the tradition of applying the Equal Protection Clause to
protect federal voting rights. The Court observed that states could
not “value one person’s vote over that of another” in federal
elections. 397 The Court followed Reynolds v. Sims in arguing that “the
right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by prohibiting the free exercise of
the franchise.”398 In this respect, said the Court, there was “no difference

392. See Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1, 38–42,
56 (1990) (describing how statutes can sometimes provide more determinate answers
than constitutional norms or standards).
393. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
394. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
395. Id. at 103 (holding “the use of standardless manual recounts” under state
election laws “violates the Equal Protection Clause”).
396. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED
ELECTION 2000 4 (2001) (arguing that Bush v. Gore was decided on grounds only of
partisan politics); Tribe, supra note 49, at 178 (same).
397. 531 U.S. at 104–05 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665
(1966)).
398. Id. at 105 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).

2074

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1981

between the two sides of the present controversy.” 399 The dissenting
minority opinions followed leading equal protection cases too, though
coming to the opposite conclusion on the merits.400
The recent case of Shelby County v. Holder401 is also not to the contrary.
In Shelby County, the Court referred favorably to the history of the
voting-rights amendments and the passage of the Voting Rights Act. 402
Plaintiffs challenged the singling out of southern states for special
review and oversight, and the Court found this part of the Voting
Rights Act to conflict with concerns about federalism. 403 Dubiously,
the Court claimed the political and social culture in the United States
had evolved beyond the racial discrimination of the past, especially in
the old southern slave states. 404 In making this empirical judgment,
the Court nonetheless recognized the success of the Voting Rights
Act, as well as its constitutionality. 405
Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the Court, endorsed a futureoriented interpretation: “The Fifteenth Amendment commands that
the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race or
color, and it gives Congress the power to enforce that command. The
Amendment is not designed to punish for the past; its purpose is to
ensure a better future.” 406 The Senate Reform Act is designed precisely

399. Id. at 105; see also AMAR, supra note 135, at 195 (noting that conservative as
well as liberal justices “accept the basic teachings” of cases such as Baker and Reynolds).
400. 531 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing the Equal Protection
Clause might apply in a “remedial scheme” involving vote recounts); id. at 143
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (recognizing that an “equal protection claim” might make
sense if “perfection [was] the appropriate standard for judging the recount,” but “we
live in an imperfect world”).
401. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
402. Id. at 536–37.
403. Id. at 557.
404. Id. at 547 (“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.”). Justice
Ginsburg contested the main empirical premise of the Court’s opinion, noting that
the enactment of new impediments to voting rights had sprung up in the form of
many “second-generation barriers” that made fighting them like “battling the Hydra.”
Id. at 560, 563 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
405. Id. at 548 (majority opinion) (highlighting that the Voting Rights Act has
been empirically successful and has “proved immensely successful at redressing racial
discrimination and integrating the voting process,” especially for voter registration
and turnout).
406. Id. at 553.
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in this fashion: to provide equal voting rights for all American citizens
in “a better future.”
IV. POLITICAL BALANCE AND FEASIBILITY
The proposed Senate Reform Act is drawn mathematically and in
politically neutral terms. 407 Because it would produce relatively
balanced political outcomes for Republicans and Democrats, the
“red” and the “blue,” it should also prove politically feasible. 408
Consider the following analysis. Working from the template of the
2016 presidential election, and allocating all gains and losses of
senators in the reform to states according to their votes in that election,
big red states like Texas and Florida would gain eleven senators as against
ten extra senators for big blue California. Losses of senators in small states
would roughly even out: losses in low-population western red states
countering losses in the blue states of New England. See Table 8 on the
next page.409

407. See supra Part II.
408. See STEVE KORNACKI, THE RED AND THE BLUE: THE 1990S AND THE BIRTH OF
POLITICAL TRIBALISM 4–5 (2018) (noting the origin of sports-like colors for the main
political parties in the “accidental” coverage by multiple television networks which all
used red and blue in the same way during the closely divided presidential election in
2000).
409. Table 8 provides rough estimates allocating party gains or losses in senators
to outcomes based on the 2016 presidential election. See 2016 Presidential Election
Actual Results, 270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/map-images/2016-actualelectoral -map [https://perma.cc/6ALA-8D5J].
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Table 8: Estimated Net Gains/Losses of Senators in Red and Blue States
State

Vote in 2016

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine †
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

Trump
Trump
Trump
Trump
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Trump
Trump
Clinton
Trump
Clinton
Trump
Trump
Trump
Trump
Trump
Clinton/Trump
Clinton
Clinton
Trump
Clinton
Trump
Trump
Trump
Trump
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Trump
Trump

New
Senators
2
1
2
1
12
2
1
1
6
3
1
1
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
6
3
1

Net Gain/
Loss
0
-1
0
-1
+10
-1
-1
-1
+4
+1
-1
-1
+2
0
-1
-1
-1
-1
0
0
0
+1
0
-1
0
-1
-1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+4
+1
-1

2019]
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Net gain/loss

SENATE DEMOCRACY
Trump
Trump
Clinton
Trump
Clinton
Trump
Trump
Trump
Trump
Trump
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Trump
Trump
Trump

2077
4
1
1
4
1
2
1
2
9
1
1
3
2
1
2
1

+2
-1
-1
+2
-1
0
-1
0
+7
-1
-1
+1
0
-1
0
-1
Blue +8/
Red +2

† Maine split its electoral votes.

Overall, this simple, straightforward model yields a national gain of eight
Democrats compared with a gain of two Republicans, but this does not
account for the likely variations within states with respect to election
methods likely to give “purple” outcomes of mixed-party representation in
larger states.410 Moreover, even if all votes in the Electoral College in 2016
had been, hypothetically, awarded according to the reformed
apportionment as illustrated in Table 8, the outcome of the election would
not have changed. 411 Although the proposed reform may initially
benefit Democrats, the overall long-term political consequences
would be uncertain. 412 At least, our political future would be more

410. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
411. Trump won 304 electoral votes compared with Clinton’s 227, so six or eight
more votes for Clinton would not have mattered. See Presidential Election Results:
Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/elections/2016/results/president [https://perma.cc/26H6-ZBUS].
412. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Franco Mattei, Senate
Apportionment and Partisan Advantage: A Second Look, 26 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 391, 406
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fair and representative. One might observe, however, that under the
Senate Reform Act a current majority of twenty-six states would lose a
senator.413 Why would any of them agree?
If U.S. senators and representatives voted only in the interest of their
own states’ relative power, then the reform would indeed fail.
Representatives in the House would likely follow the interests of their
states and vote in favor of the reform. Senators, though, would balk. Those
in the twelve states gaining senators would vote yes. Those in another twelve
states that keep two senators might say yes too. Those in the twenty-six states
that lose a senator, though, would kill the bill.414
Sectional politics of this kind, however, no longer rules the day.415 In the
post-World War II period, presidential leadership and ideologically split
parties matter more than sectional or geographical differences.416 Since the
1970s, ideology has grown more important—with Democrats becoming
more “liberal” and Republicans more “conservative.”417 Ideological
polarization now trumps regional and geographical divisions.418 Indicating
(2001) (finding no long-term advantage for a political party from unequal
apportionment in the Senate).
413. See supra Tables 1 & 8.
414. See supra text accompanying note 92 (summarizing allocation of senators).
415. Compare FREDERICK J. TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SECTIONS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (1932) (expressing the old view), with Harvey L. Schantz, The Erosion of
Sectionalism in Presidential Elections, 24 POLITY 355, 356–57, 364–65 (1992) (discussing
evidence supporting the views of scholars such as V. O. Key and E. E.
Schnattschneider that the influence of parties has eclipsed the importance of
regional sectionalism in American presidential elections).
416. See, e.g., Peter H. Odegard, Presidential Leadership and Party Responsibility, 307
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 66 (1956).
417. These labels are, of course, rather imprecise and often misleading.
“Conservatives,” for example, are often not very “conservative” today regarding the
use or preservation of the natural environment. See, e.g., Peter J. Jacques et al., The
Organisation of Denial: Conservative Think Tanks and Environmental Scepticism, 17 ENVT’L
POL. 349 (2008) (documenting the strong influence of conservative nongovernmental organizations promoting an anti-environmentalist agenda). But see
generally ROGER SCRUTON, HOW TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT THE PLANET: THE CASE FOR
AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATISM (2012).
418. See Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary
American Politics, 46 POLITY 411 (2014) (finding more ideological differences
characterizing both political elites and masses of citizens today than at any time since
the Civil War); Pildes, supra note 96, at 332 (observing that the “radically polarized
politics, and the absence of a center in American democracy today, reflect long-term
structural and historical changes in American democracy that are likely to endure for
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the depth of continuing racial division in the United States, scholars and
journalists identify a key watershed in the ideological fervor of the civil rights
reforms of the 1960s, including the Voting Rights Act of 1965.419 The
election of the first black president stoked implicit as well as explicit racist
reactions.420 In response, there is a growing social movement aiming at a
Third Reconstruction.421 In this context, a Senate Reform Act is politically
feasible from an ideological point of view because it would improve voting
equality and racial justice in America, and thus may find a place as part of
an agenda for a Third Reconstruction.
Another objection to the reform is that urban states would gain and rural
states would lose.422 This prediction is broadly true. Census data shows that
ten of the eleven states with forty percent or more of their population in
rural areas would lose a senator under the reform.423 However, other than
some time to come”); see also Andre Prokop, See Congress Polarize Over the Past 60 Years,
in One Beautiful Chart, VOX (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2015/4/23
/8485443 [https://perma.cc/A377-UNQ6] (providing a graphical representation of
increasing polarization in Congress over the last several decades).
419. Hare & Poole, supra note 418, at 415–16; see also KORNACKI, supra note 408, at
23–26 (commenting on the importance of political shifts among Democrats and
Republicans on racial issues).
420. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Obama Was Right: He Came Too Early, WASH. POST (June
1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-brings-on-the-deaththroes-of-white-hegemony/2018/06/01/0cf2d636-65c7-11e8-a69c-b944de66d9e7
[https://perma.cc/UVC2-6T6F] (arguing that “Trump cunningly exploited and
stoked racial grievance with his subtle and overt nods to white nationalism”); Erika
Wilson, The Great American Dilemma: Law and the Intransigence of Racism, 20 CUNY L.
REV. 513, 519 (2017) (arguing that “as the election of Donald J. Trump to the
presidency revealed, racism remains the Great American Dilemma”). For further
discussion, see also supra note 266 and accompanying text.
421. See supra note 372 and accompanying text; see also Ed Kilgore, Democrats’
Voting-Rights Push Could Begin a Third Reconstruction, INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 21, 2019),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/03/voting-rights-push-could-begin-a-thirdreconstruction.html [https://perma.cc/PAN6-ZFCL] (arguing that reversing voting
suppression and emphasizing voting rights may serve as the focal point for a Third
Reconstruction).
422. Randy Tobler made this argument in a discussion of an early working paper
version of this Article on his radio show. Randy Tobler Show: Eric Orts, KFTK RADIO
(Jan. 12, 2019), https://971talk.radio.com/media/audio-channel/eric-orts-1-1219mp3 [https://perma.cc/85H7-BTP3]; see also supra text accompanying note 202.
423. STATE LIBRARY OF IOWA, STATE DATA CTR. PROGRAM, URBAN AND RURAL
POPULATION FOR THE U.S. AND ALL STATES: 1900–2000, https://www.iowadatacenter.
org/datatables/UnitedStates/urusstpop19002000.pdf. The ten rural states are
Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota,

2080

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1981

an obvious self-interested claim by people living in rural areas, it is not clear
what principle should grant them a special privilege, especially when the
voting weight differentials are so large. Surely, the founders had no original
intent to privilege rural areas given that ninety-five percent of the country
was rural at the time of the first census in 1790.424 They could not have
foreseen the urban revolution. The better substantive argument is that rural
states do not deserve better or more representation simply because they are
rural. Given that rural populations now represent only one-fifth of the total
population, this fact is not likely to be decisive politically either.425 As
indicated above too, rural citizens in very large states are also currently
underrepresented by the one state, two senators rule, and the reform would
likely increase their relative representation.426
A related practical political hurdle may arise from what is known as the
endowment effect or status quo bias.427 States that “lose” a senator may
feel more strongly about the loss as opposed to “gains” for other states. One
option to alleviate this concern is to double the number of senators
allocated to all states, thus leaving two senators as a minimum for each state
(eliminating any direct feeling of “loss” of an initial “endowment”), and
following a Rule of Two Hundred to allocate other seats.428 This would
almost double the size of the reformed Senate to 216 senators rather than
110. See Table 9 on the next page.429
Following a Rule of Two Hundred would reduce the attractiveness of the
proposal with respect to following tradition with respect to size. However, it
South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia. Alabama is on the cusp of the cut-off and
was rounded up to two senators. See supra Table 1.
424. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION: 1790 TO 1990, tbl.4, https://www.
census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf.
425. Id.; see also Paul Krugman, Real America Versus Senate America, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
9, 2018, at A31 (lamenting that the Senate “drastically overweights” rural areas and
“underweights the places where most Americans live”).
426. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
427. The endowment effect refers to an experimentally verified irrational
tendency for people to value property that they already have (even if just given to
them) more than traditional economic analysis suggests. Status quo bias is a similar
“anomaly” to rational decision-making related to “loss aversion.” See Daniel
Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,
5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193 (1991).
428. See supra Part II (explaining a Rule of One Hundred allocation); supra Table
1 (showing the allocation).
429. Table 9 uses the same census data as Table 1 but applies a unit of measure
.05% of the total U.S. population.
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would remove the potentially politically difficult prospect of proposing that
states such as Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, which are
currently early primary venues for presidential candidates, would all “lose a
senator” under the reform.430
Table 9: Proposed Allocation of Senators under a Rule of Two Hundred
State

2017 Population*

United States
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan

325,719,178
4,874,747
739,795
7,016,270
3,004,279
39,536,653
5,607,154
3,588,184
961,939
20,984,400
10,429,379
1,427,538
1,716,943
12,802,023
6,666,818
3,145,711
2,913,123
4,454,189
4,684,333
1,335,907
6,052,177
6,859,819
9,962,311

Share of One
Percent of
Total U.S.
Population

Proposed
Senators
based on
.05 units

1.49
.23
2.15
.92
12.13
1.72
1.10
.30
6.44
3.20
.44
.53
3.93
2.05
.97
.89
1.37
1.44
.41
1.86
2.11
3.06

3
2
4
2
24
3
2
2
13
6
2
2
8
4
2
2
3
3
2
4
4
6

430. 2020 Primary Schedule, ELECTION CENT., https://www.uspresidentialelection
news.com/2020-presidential-primary-schedule-calendar [https://perma.cc/GC54TKWS].
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Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total Senators
District of
Columbia
Puerto Rico
Pacific Islands
American Indians
and Alaskan
Natives

[Vol. 68:1981

5,576,606
2,984,100
6,113,532
1,050,493
1,920,076
2,998,039
1,342,795
9,005,644
2,088,070
19,849,399
10,273,419
755,393
11,658,609
3,930,864
4,142,776
12,805,537
1,059,639
5,024,369
869,666
6,715,984
28,304,596
3,101,833
623,657
8,470,020
7,405,743
1,815,857
5,795,483
579,315

1.71
.92
1.88
.32
.59
.92
.41
2.76
.64
6.09
3.15
.23
3.58
1.21
1.27
3.93
.33
1.54
.27
2.06
8.69
.95
.19
2.60
2.27
.56
1.78
.18

693,972

.21

3
2
4
2
2
2
2
6
2
12
6
2
7
2
2
8
2
3
2
4
17
2
2
5
4
2
4
2
216
(2)

3,337,177
375,165
2,726,278

1.02
.11
.73

(2)
(2)
(2)

* U.S. Census, 2017 estimate used for illustration purposes only.
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Even though the Senate Reform Act is drawn in politically neutral
terms, and even though the political future is highly uncertain and
difficult to predict, it is nevertheless likely that most Republicans
today would oppose the reform for two reasons. First, Republicans
have tended in recent years to adopt a strong “states’ rights” view of
political and constitutional theory, and the proposal follows in a
Madisonian nationalist strain. 431 Second, Republicans benefit from
the current status quo bias in the Senate favoring white voters. In
both the 2016 presidential election and the 2018 midterms,
Republicans attracted more white voters (by 10 to 20% margins),
while Democrats had an edge in nonwhite categories (including
approximately 80% margins among black voters, 40 to 50% among
Asian voters, and almost 40% among Hispanic voters). 432 For similar
431. See, e.g., Gary Miller & Norman Schofield, The Transformation of the Republican
and Democratic Party Coalitions in the U.S., 6 PERSP. ON POL. 433, 438 (2008) (noting the
“transformation of the GOP from the nationalist party of Lincoln to the party of
states’ rights—a transformation that made possible a coalition of business interests,
western sagebrush rebels, and southern populists”); see also supra notes 5 & 310 (citing
sources on Madison’s strong nationalist preferences for senate representation). For
an argument that contemporary Republicans are following in the racially tinged
tradition of “states’ rights” advocated by the likes of John C. Calhoun, which is
supported by an unrepresentative Senate, see NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN
CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE RADICAL RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA 1–11,
24–25, 224–26 (2017).
432. See Coates, The First White President, supra note 266 (reporting on white
majorities across all categories won by Trump in 2016, and Trump’s lack of support
in almost all nonwhite categories); William H. Frey, 2018 Exit Polls Show Greater White
Support for Democrats, fig.2, BROOKINGS (Nov. 8, 2018) (compiling data from exit polls
showing whites favoring Republicans but by lesser margins than in 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/11/08/2018-exit-polls-showgreater-white-support-for-democrats [https://perma.cc/3B83-LHLJ].
The unpleasant but plain truth is also that Republicans support voter suppression
campaigns against minority voters. See Lopez, supra note 258. Republicans have
become a decidedly “pro-white” party—if not implicitly a white nationalist one—with
its strength lying almost entirely in white majorities. A turning point was the decision
of Richard Nixon to adopt a “southern strategy” in his presidential campaign. See
ALEXANDER, supra note 263, at 44–45. Black voters began to prefer Democratic
candidates during the New Deal, and Democrats began to lose a majority of white
voters, driven mainly by a loss of white southern voters, after the landslide of Lyndon
Johnson in 1964 and the turn of Nixon’s southern strategy. Stephen Ansolabehere
et al., Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of the
Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1385, 1400–01 (2010).
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reasons of race and politics, Republicans are probably unlikely to
support a reform that would make it easier to add the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico as new states. 433 Far-sighted Republicans,
however, might consider whether they would prefer the proposed
reform that would allow adding the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico as states with only one senator each to the alternative of adding
both with two senators. One can also imagine a future in which
Republicans abandoned a racially clouded political strategy.
Under at least some future circumstances, then, one can imagine a
scenario in which a “blue wave” would continue to build, 434 and
Democrats could win control of the Senate and the Presidency, as well
as the House, in 2020, 2024, or 2028. Republicans in some large states
might then also be persuaded to support Senate reform along the
lines indicated here because it would improve their likely outcomes
in future elections. For example, Republicans in large states such as
California and New York, and perhaps Florida and Texas too, are
currently underrepresented in the Senate. 435 If the proposed Senate
Reform Act gathered support from both a Democratic president and
a Democratic Congress, along with some Republican support in big
states, then it is feasible that enough Democrats in small states and
Republicans in large ones could support the change on grounds of
fairness and national unity, as well as partisan politics. A Senate
Reform Act would then pass into law.
CONCLUSION: MAKE THE SENATE A DEMOCRACY AGAIN
The unrepresentative structure of the Senate has been stitched into
the constitutional fabric of the United States from the beginning. It
is a fabric that has been stained by the inherited sin of African slavery
and the long exclusion of indigenous people and women.

433. See, e.g., John Hawkins, A Conservative Case Against Statehood for Puerto Rico,
NAT’L REV. (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/03/puerto-ricostatehood-conservative-case-against [https://perma.cc/T8DV-VWLC]. But see Kyle
Sammin, A Conservative Case for Puerto Rican Statehood, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/03/puerto-rico-statehood
[https://perma.cc/A7F4-Y9ZT] (arguing in favor of admitting Puerto Rico as a state
on grounds that it would strengthen federalism).
434. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
435. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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Over time, a civil war and other political battles have expanded the
franchise beyond the property-owning, often slaveholding white men
who wrote and ratified the original text of the Constitution. These
victories overstitched permanent patches into our constitutional
clothing. The Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth,
and Twentieth-Sixth Amendments enshrine a right to vote to all
adults equally, without regard to race, ethnicity, color, national
origin, sex, sexual orientation, wealth, and age. They explicitly
delegate to Congress the power of enforcement.
It has been said “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends
toward justice.”436 This has been true in the United States with respect
to the evolution of constitutional protections of voting rights, though it
has followed a spiraling or zig-zag pattern of historical progression.437
The U.S. Senate, as shown here, has become increasingly skewed in
representation. It is an outlier among modern democracies in the
severity of its unequal distribution of voting weight and power,
disfavoring all citizens who live in large states. This unequal
representation is also heavily biased in favor of white people, as well

436. Martin Luther King, Jr., repeated the phrase memorably in his speeches.
President Obama used the phrase as well, attributing it to King, and even had it
inscribed on a rug in the Oval Office. The abolitionist Unitarian minister Theodore
Parker, however, gets credit for the first use of the idea. In 1853, Parker preached:
I do not pretend to understand the moral universe. The arc is a long one.
My eye reaches but little ways. I cannot calculate the curve and complete the
figure by experience of sight. I can divine it by conscience. And from what
I see I am sure it bends toward justice.
See Theodore Parker and the “Moral Universe,” NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 2, 2010),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129609461
[https://perma.cc/ND72-BZ9L] (recounting this history of the idea and its
phrasings).
437. Cf. SMITH, supra note 182, at 19–20, 23–35 (describing “the spiral of politics”
in defining “peoplehood” in the United States and elsewhere); Transcript: President
Obama’s Remarks on Donald Trump’s Election, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/09/transcriptpresident-obamas-remarks-on-donald-trumps-election [https://perma.cc/87NY-MT
WR] (“[T]he path that this country has taken has never been a straight line. We zig
and zag and sometimes we move in ways that some people think is forward and others
think is moving back, and that’s OK.”).
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as biased, though less strongly so, against women and other protected
categories of citizens regarding age and sexual orientation. 438
In these circumstances, Congress should exercise its power under
the voting-rights amendments. It should correct this injustice that lies
at the core of American democracy. It should act to place all U.S.
citizens on a more equal footing in their Senate.
The Senate Reform Act recommended here provides a simple
mathematical solution. It employs the Rule of One Hundred to adjust
the allocation of senators to the states. Big states would add senators,
mid-sized states would retain two senators, and small states would lose a
senator. The overall number of senators would remain about the same,
increasing from 100 to 110. If politically more feasible, a reform could
follow instead of a Rule of Two Hundred in order to avoid the loss
aversion that small states might otherwise feel too acutely. Other than
total number and allocation of seats, all constitutional rules regarding
the Senate would remain the same.
There are other structural advantages to the proposal. Because it is
politically easier to add a new state with one senator rather than two, the
reform would pave a path to potential statehood for the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and perhaps the Pacific Islands and indigenous
peoples. The reform would automatically render the Electoral College
more representative of the nation, relieving pressure for other
potentially more disruptive changes, such as an interstate compact for a
national popular vote. The reform would counter the tendency for
senators in small states to siphon more than their fair share of
government spending from the federal budget.
Despite these advantages, some may stubbornly contend that the
one state, two senators rule can never change—because the original
text of the Constitution says so! However, standard modes of
constitutional interpretation give a different answer. The text of the
later voting-rights amendments empowers Congress to override the
original one state, two senators rule because the Senate, as presently
constituted, abridges the equal voting rights of U.S. citizens. Textual
analysis, as well as consideration of structure, history, morality, and
legal authority, support interpreting the reform as constitutional.

438. Distortions among the states with respect to other characteristics not reviewed
here empirically, such as wealth, religion, and national origin, are also highly likely.
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It is absurd to say a bad constitutional rule can never be changed,
except by a revolution. We should not read the Constitution to put a
straightjacket on the progression of representative government,
binding us forever to the dead hand of an inflexible past. “The Earth
belongs always to the living generation,” said Thomas Jefferson, and
“the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.” 439
Once before, the Seventeenth Amendment made the Senate more
democratic, transferring the right to vote for U.S. senators from state
legislators directly to the people. It is time now to resolve our national
Lockean paradox of unequal representation. We should make the
Senate a democracy, again.

439. TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 280 (quoting Jefferson).

